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IMPEACHING FEDERAL JUDGES: A STUDY
OF TUE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
JOHN D. FEERICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
ON April 15, 1970, Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford of Michigan
reported to the House of Representatives on a study he had made
concerning the law of impeachment and the behavior of Associate Justice
William 0. Douglas of the United States Supreme Court.' His report
contained, in substance, five charges against Justice Douglas which, he
said, would justify his removal from office. In the first charge, he stated
that Justice Douglas voted in favor of Ralph Ginzburg, the editor and
publisher of Fact magazine, in a libel suit brought against him and the
publication by Senator Barry Goldwater.2 While the case was pending in
the lower federal courts, Justice Douglas wrote an article in Avant Garde,
a Ginzburg publication and the alleged successor to Fact, entitled "Appeal
of Folk Singing: A Landmark Opinion," for which he was paid three
hundred and fifty dollars. The second specification was that Justice
Douglas wrote an inflammatory book, Points of Rebellion, setting forth
the thesis that "violence may be justified and perhaps only revolutionary
overthrow of 'the establishment' can save the country."' The third allega-
tion was that Justice Douglas allowed excerpts from Points of Rebellion
to appear in Evergreen magazine near nude photographs and a caricature
of President Nixon as King George III. As the fourth charge, he cited
Justice Douglas' association with Albert Parvin and the Albert Parvin
Foundation, in connection with which he allegedly assisted in organizing
the Foundation in violation of federal law,4 gave legal advice to the
Foundation on dealing with the Internal Revenue Service, accepted from
it an annual salary of twelve thousand dollars, and came in contact with
alleged international gamblers. The fifth charge involved Justice Douglas'
allegedly close association "with the leftish Center for the Study of
* Member of the New York Bar. The author wishes to express his deep appreciation to
Associate Editor Robert Quinn of the Fordham Law Review and to Edward Yodowitz, Esq.
of his firm for their excellent research and drafting assistance, without which this article
would not have been possible.
1. 116 Cong. Rec. H3112 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1970).
2. Ginzburg v. Goldwater, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970), denying cert. to 414 F.2d 324 (1969).
3. Professor Leonard F. Manning's review of this book is contained in this issue of the
Fordhim Law Review.
4. This statute provides: "Any justice or judge appointed under the authority of the
United States who engages in the practice of law is guilty of a high misdemeanor." 28 U.S.C.
§ 454 (1964).
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Democratic Institutions," a "focal point for organization of militant
student unrest."
Concerning the law of impeachment, Representative Ford expressed
his conclusion that "an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of
the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in
history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds
of the [Senate] considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of
the accused from office." 5
On the same day that this report was delivered, Representative Andrew
Jacobs, Jr. of Indiana introduced an impeachment resolution which in-
corporated all of the foregoing charges.' This resolution was referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary, which appointed a Special Subcommittee
to investigate the charges.' At this writing, the Subcommittee's investiga-
tion is in progress.'
The initiation of impeachment proceedings against Justice Douglas has
once again brought into sharp focus the constitutional provisions relating
to impeachment, reviving controversies of long standing regarding the
meaning of those provisions.' Article I of the Constitution provides that
5. 116 Cong. Rec. H3113 (daily ed. April 15, 1970). A legal memorandum subsequently
submitted by Representative Ford from the distinguished Michigan law firm of Dykema,
Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg, concluded that "it is the conscience of Congress--actlng
in accordance with the constitutional limitations-which determines whether conduct of a
judge constitutes misbehavior requiring impeachment and removal from office." Special
Subcomm. on H.R. 920 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sees., Legal
Materials on Impeachment 23 (1970).
6. H.R. Res. 920, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). More than one hundred members of the
House of Representatives have introduced resolutions calling for the appointment of a Select
Committee to investigate the conduct of Justice Douglas. See First Report by the Special
Subcomm. on H.R. 920 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 44-50
(1970).
7. The Subcommittee consists of Representatives Emanuel Celler of New York, Its
chairman; Byron G. Rogers of Colorado; Jack B. Brooks of Texas; William M. McCulloch
of Ohio; and Edward Hutchinson of Michigan. On June 20, 1970, the Subcommittee sub-
mitted its first report. See note 6 supra. On August 11, 1970, it submitted a collection of
legal materials on impeachment. See note 5 supra.
8. The subcommittee was originally scheduled to complete its investigation by June 24.
The deadline has been extended at the subcommittee's request, reportedly because of Its
inability to obtain requested information from various departments of the executive branch.
See N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1970, at 19, col. 3.
9. An impeachment proceeding may be started by charges made on the floor of the
House of Representatives against a public official by a member of the House. It may also
be initiated by a presidential message, a state legislature, a petition, or a memorial con-
taining charges under oath. Once charges are preferred, a standing or special committee of
the House is designated to investigate and report. The official under investigation may be
given an opportunity to appear at the committee hearings to testify, present evidence, and
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the House of Representatives shall have the "sole Power of Impeach-
ment" and that the Senate shall have the "sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments."'"0 Article I further provides that "no Person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present" and that
the judgment "shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit
under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, ac-
cording to Law."'' Article H, Section 2 excludes cases of impeachment
from the President's power to grant reprieves and pardons "for offenses
against the United States." Article II, Section 4 provides that "[t]he
President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'- Article III states
that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by jury," and also provides that "Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... "
These provisions give rise to a number of questions: What is an im-
peachable offense? Is it limited to something which is indictable, or does
it embrace acts of a non-indictable nature? If the latter, does it extend
to non-official as well as official conduct? Does the "good Behaviour"
judicial tenure provision of Article III furnish an independent ground
for impeachment in the case of judges?
The purpose of this article is to examine the impeachment provisions
cross-examine witnesses. When the committee concludes its investigation, its report is acted
upon. If the report recommends impeachment, it will set forth a proposed resolution con-
taining the articles (charges) of impeachment against the official. If the report is adopted
by the House, several Representatives will be designated as Managers to prosecute the case.
Subsequently, the House notifies the Senate by message of the impeachment; the Senate
notifies the House that it is ready to receive the articles of impeachment; the House-
appointed Managers present the articles to the Senate; and the Senate organizes for trial.
The impeached official is afforded an opportunity to appear, in person or by counsel, and
answer the charges. After the pleading stage, the actual trial begins, at which witnesses are
sworn and examined by the Managers and may be cross-examined by the impeached official
or his counsel At the conclusion of the Managers' case, the official may present his defense.
Thereafter, a vote is taken on each article of impeachment. Special Subcomm. on H.R. 920
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 5, at 1-3.
10. US. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 3.
11. Id. § 3.
12. Treason is defined in U.S. Const. art. 3, § 3, which states: "Treason against the
United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless
on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court."
19701
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of the Constitution:1 3 in particular, to trace their common law and
colonial antecedents, to explore their development at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, to examine the twelve cases of impeachment in
United States history, and to offer an interpretation of the constitutional
14provisions.
13. For an excellent book on the subject, see A. Simpson, A Treatise on Federal Im-
peachments (1916) [hereinafter cited as Simpson]. See also 6 C. Cannon, Cannon's Prec-
dents of the House of Representatives of the United States §§ 455-66 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as Cannon's Precedents]; W. Carpenter, Judicial Tenure in the United States (1918);
3 A. Hinds, Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States
§§ 2008-23 (1907) [hereinafter cited as Hinds' Precedents]; Brown, The Impeachment of
the Federal Judiciary, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 684 (1913); Haley, The Impeachment of Federal
Officers in United States History, 10 The Historian 135 (1948); Lawrence, The Law of
Impeachment, 15 Am. L. Reg. 641 (1867); Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, 12 St. Louis
L. Rev. 15 (1927); Taylor, The American Law of Impeachment, 180 N. Am. Rev. 508
(1905); Thomas, The Law of Impeachment in the United States, 2 Am. Pol. Set. Rev. 378
(1908).
14. This article does not deal with the question of whether impeachment is the exclusive
method of disciplining federal judges. For authority that Congress has power to establish
non-impeachment procedures, such as a special court or commission, see Comment, Removal
of Federal Judges-New Alternative to an Old Problem: Chandler v. Judicial Council of
the Tenth Circuit, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1385 (1966); Comment, Removal of Federal Judges
-Alternatives to Impeachment, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 723 (1967); statement of Assistant At-
torney General William H. Rehnquist, Hearings on S. 1506 before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 115 Cong. Rec. 14,909
(June 5, 1969) (remarks of Senator Joseph Tydings). For authority that impeachment Is
exclusive, see Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes
from History, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1969); Ziskind, Judicial Tenure In the American
Constitution; English and American Precedents, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 135; Comment,
Courts-Judidal Responsibility-Statutory and Constitutional Problems Relating to Meth-
ods for Removal or Discipline of Judges, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 153 (1966); Comment, The
Chandler Incident and Problems of Judicial Removal, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 448 (1967). See
generally Kramer & Barron, The Constitutionality of Removal and Mandatory Retirement
Procedures for the Federal Judiciary; The Meaning of "During Good Behaviour," 35 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 455 (1967); Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is it Constitutional?, 7 U. Kan.
City L. Rev. 3 (1938); Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-
Some Possibilities Under the Constitution (pts. 1-3), 28 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 723, 870 (1929-
1930); Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the Constitution, 51
Harv. L. Rev. 330 (1967). See also the authorities referred to in note 286 infra. In a dissent
to the Supreme Court's June 1, 1970 decision in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth
Circuit, 398 US. 74 (1970), Justices Douglas and Black stated their view that impeach-
ment is "the only leverage" under the Constitution against a judge. "If they break a law,
they can be prosecuted. If they become corrupt or sit in cases in which they have a per-
sonal or family stake, they can be impeached by Congress." Id. at 140. See their dissent
in the earlier decision in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003,
1004-06 (1966). For an interesting view of how Congress could "modernize"* the impeach-
ment process, see Stolz, Disciplining Federal Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 Callf.
L. Rev. 659 (1969).
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HI. DEVELOPMENT OF IMPEACHMENT PROVISIONS
A. Common Law Antecedents
While the origin of Impeachment remains unsettled, 5 the first English
impeachments are believed to have occurred during the reign of Edward
III (1327-1377). 11 During the early part of this reign, Parliament for-
mally separated into the two houses of Lords and Commons and acquired
some of the legislative powers which it has today." In 1376, the House
of Commons instituted impeachment proceedings against Richard Lyons
and, later that year, against Lords Latimer and Neville." Upon convic-
tion by the House of Lords, Lyons was forbidden to ever hold office,
while Latimer was ousted from all his offices.1 It was not, however, until
the reign of Henry IV (1399-1413) that the procedure was firmly estab-
lished whereby the House of Commons instituted impeachment proceed-
ings and the House of Lords tried such cases ' 2 Both public officials and
private individuals were subject to impeachment. -' Conviction in the
15. It has been observed that the origins of impeachment can be traced to the Athenian
Constitution. Upon leaving office, public officials in Athens were subject to an examination
in law courts composed of citizens who acted as judges, in panels, and who were enrolled
by lot. The people were given an opportunity to bring charges against the officials in these
courts, which were kmown as the "heliaea." M. Hart, The Origin of the Constitution of the
United States of America 19, April 25, 1927 (unpublished thesis in Boston College Library).
Some English historians trace the origin of impeachment to the early criminal procedures
of conviction by record and conviction by notoriety. See Pluckmett, The Origin of Impeach-
ment, 24 Royal Historical Soey Transactions 47 (4th ser. 1942).
16. 4 Hatsell's Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons 62-63, 73-74 (1796)
[hereinafter cited as Hatsell]; 1 H. Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the English Con-
stitution 441 (1889) [hereinafter cited as Taylor].
17. 1 Taylor 517.
18. The Commons impeached Richard Lyons for certain misdemeanors in removing the
staple of wool from Calais (see 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 233-34 (Chitty ed. 1851)),
lending funds to the Crown at exorbitant interest, and purchasing Crown debts from
creditors below value. Latimer and Neville were subsequently impeached on similar charges.
See Hatsell 50-51; Simpson 85-86; A. Wilshire, Constitutional History 43 (1929).
19. Simpson 85.
20. Prior to the reign of Henry IV, there were instances of charges being brought against
public officials by the Crown, other public officials, lords, commoners, and private citizens.
There were also variations in the forum which tried the impeachments. Sometimes the
Crown was the trier; at other times, the Crown and the House of Lords; and still other times,
various officials. Id. at 5-6; see Hatsell 74-76. In 1387 Richard II (1377-1399) sought and
obtained an opinion from the judges that no official or judge could be impeached in Parlia-
ment without the will of the King. This opinion was nullified by Parliament during the
first year of the reign of Henry IV. Simpson 6-7.
21. A. Carter, A History of the English Courts 64-65 (1927) [hereinafter cited as
Carter]; Hatsell 75.
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House of Lords was by majority vote,12 and there generally was no
limitation on the punishment that could be imposed.
From 1376 to 1450, there were a number of cases in which ministers
and judges were impeached.24 Beginning in 1460 and continuing until
1620, impeachment fell into disuse because of the decline in the influence
of Parliament. During that interval, bills of attainder were frequently
utilized and the great state trials took place in the Star Chamber." Be-
tween 1621 and 1787, more than fifty impeachment trials were held.2"
Many of these involved private individuals.
As early as 1388, Parliament employed the impeachment process
against the judiciary. In that year Robert Belknap and five other judges
were jointly impeached by the Commons for treason in answering "certain
questions submitted to them as judges, wrongfully. ' 2 In convicting them,
the Lords apparently thought themselves not bound by the common or
civil law as used in the inferior courts, but only by the discussions and
precedents of Parliament 8 Similarly, in 1641 Sir Robert Berkley and
others were impeached for high treason and misdemeanors. 29 Berkley,
22. The House of Commons functioned as prosecutor, appearing by Managers appointed
for the trial, who presented the articles of impeachment. Carter 64; G. Cross & G. Hall,
The English Legal System 223 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Cross & Hall].
23. 24 Halsbury's Laws of England 216 n.m (2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as Hals-
bury]. In 1388, after convicting five judges, the House of Lords sentenced them to be
"drawn and hanged as traitors, their heirs disinherited, and their lands, tenements, goods,
and chattels forfeited to the King." Hatsell 54-55. It appears that the sentence was
later commuted to banishment to Ireland. Simpson 88.
24. Hatsell states that during this period the Commons impeached for treason, mis-
demeanors, maladministration, and extrajudicial conduct of judges. Hatsell 63; see Simpson
85-90.
25. Carter 66; Hatsell 78-88. Taylor states that no impeachments occurred between that
of Lord Stanley in 1459 and Sir Giles Mompesson in 1621-a period of one hundred apd
sixty-two years. 1 Taylor 442. The Star Chamber's criminal jurisdiction covered everything
in which the government felt it was interested. Offenses that would have been subject to
impeachment were tried there. Offenses of treason and treasonable practices were punished
by bills of attainder. Hatsell 66. Attainder enabled Parliament to punish a man without a
trial, avoiding the difficulty of proving a crime. See Carter 67; A. Wilshire, supra note 18,
at 59. The procedure was successfully employed against Lord Strafford in 1641. Cross &
Hall 224. It is said that the Lords would not have been able to convict him because of lack
of proof, but they were willing to vote for a bill of attainder because they were convinced
in conscience of his guilt. Id.; Taswell-Langmead's English Constitutional History 530-31
(11th ed. T. Plucknett (1960)) [hereinafter cited as Plucknett].
26. Simpson 88. Taylor, The American Law of Impeachment, 180 N. Am. Rev. 502, 504
(1905), refers to impeachments between 1621 and 1805 as the "political impeachments."
27. Simpson 88. -
28. Hatsell 64. This stand was later rejected in 1709, when the Lords resolved that they
would try cases of impeachment "according to the law of the land, and 'the law and usage
of Parliament."' Id. at 282-83.
29. Dwight, Trial by Impeachment, 15 Am. L. Reg. 257, 274 (1867).
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a judge of the King's Bench, was charged with attempting to subvert
the laws of the kingdom by traitorous words, opinions, judgments and
practices. The articles all concerned on-the-bench conduct.30 Despite the
charges against him, Berkley was tried only for his opinion in the ship
money cases,31 and was convicted by the Lords two years after his im-
peachment.32 Twenty-six years later the Commons sought to impeach
Lord Chief Justice John Keeling for improperly confining juries which
had decided cases against his wishes.33 After hearing his defense, the
House of Commons dismissed the proceedings.34
In 1680 there were two instances of futile attempts to remove judges
from office. In the first instance Sir Francis North, Chief Justice of the
Court of Common Pleas, was charged with assisting in the drafting and
passage of "A Proclamation Against Tumultuous Petitions." Although he
was impeached, nothing further came of the proceedings. 0 In the second
instance, Lord Chief Justice Scroggs and others were impeached by the
Commons for discharging a grand jury before it had made its present-
ments, legislating from the bench, setting improper fines, and other on-
the-bench conduct.36 An answer was filed by Scroggs but the case was
never tried, since Parliament was soon afterwards dissolved.
An examination of the principal articles of impeachment in approxi-
mately one hundred English impeachment cases, involving both judicial
and non-judicial officials, reveals that either "treason" or "high crimes
and misdemeanors" was the charge in more than seventy-five percent of
30. Simpson 105-09.
31. Hatsell 397. The ship money incident involved a dispute between the King and
Parliament. In 1628 Charles I consented to the Petition of Right, which prohibited the
imposition of a tax without the consent of Parliament. Charles, having disbanded Parlia-
ment and in need of funds, sought to raise revenue by requiring both port and inland
counties to provide an amount to maintain and repair the King's ships. The issue of
whether this was a tax or a customs duty came before the courts which upheld the "tax"
finding that the King's prerogative was superior to statute. When the Long Parliament
came to power, it passed an act declaring the judgment void. Those judges who had sup-
ported the King were impeached for their "ship money" opinions. See E. Haynes, Selection
and Tenure of Judges 60-67 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Haynes]; F. Maitland, The Con-
stitutional History of England 307-08 (1926).
32. For one whole term subsequent to his impeachment he continued to hold court.
Dwight, supra note 29.
33. Hatsell 113.
34. Id. at 114; Simpson 130.
35. See Hatsell 115-16; Simpson 135. "Tumultuous Petitioning" was by statute a mis-
demeanor. It was committed when more than twenty persons signed a petition to the
Crown or Parliament to change the law, without obtaining prior approval from three
judges or the grand assizes of the petition's contents. See Black's Law Dictionary 1685
(4th ed. 1951).
36. See Simpson 136-39.
1970]
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such cases.3 7 Those cases charging "high crimes and misdemeanors"
which resulted in convictions involved acts of a criminal nature, grave
misuse of one's official position, or treasonous-like conduct.88
37. Id. at 81-188. Blackstone viewed impeachment as the "trial of great and enormous
offenders" (4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 256 (4th ed. 1770)) who had seriously breached
a public trust. Id. at 258. Professor Richard Wooddeson agreed, finding that the Lords
should try the case since the influence of the accused official might obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice in the ordinary courts. 2 R. Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws
of England 611 (1792). For other views of this author, see note 284 and accompanying
text infra.
38. The convictions are those of the Earl of Suffolk, Chancellor, in 1386 (depriving the
Crown of revenue and improper use of tax funds); Sir Henry Yelverton, Attorney General,
in 1621 (acting without authority in office and neglect of office); Lord Treasurer Middlesex
in 1624 (bribery and corruption in office); Sir Edward Herbert in 1642; George Benyon
in 1642 (formulating a seditious petition) ; Sir Richard Gurney, Mayor of London, in 1642
(circulating illegal proclamations); Nine Lords at York in 1642 (support of the King in
his determination to wage war on Parliament); John Goudet and others in 1698 (trading
with the enemy in wartime); John Aurioll and John Du Maistre in 1698 (trading with the
enemy in wartime); Henry Sacheverell in 1710 (speeches against the government); and
Earl of Macclesfield, Lord Chancellor, in 1725 (extortion and sale of judicial offices). Simp-
son 86-167. Those cases charging "high crimes and misdemeanors" but not listed by Simpson
as resulting in a conviction are: Bishop Wren in 1640 (unlawful innovations and restrictions
upon religious practices); Richard Spencer in 1642; Sir Edward Dering in 1642 (formu-
Iating and circulating a seditious petition); Sir Thomas Gardiner in 1642 (enforcement of
the illegal ship money tax and preventing the filing of lawful petitions); Henry Hastings
and others in 1642 (inciting an unlawful assembly of three hundred armed persons); Lord
Viscount Mordaunt in 1666 (illegally confined and refused to accept bail in Tayleur's case,
thereby preventing Tayleur voting in Parliament); Peter Pett, Commissioner of the Navy,
in 1668 (violation of orders and negligent command, causing the loss of Crown ships);
Sir William Penn, Vice Admiral of His Majesty's fleet, in 1668 (fraud and embezzlement
of cargo) ; Earl of Orrery in 1669; Sir Francis North, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas,
in 1680 (drawing and passing an illegal petition); Duke of Leeds in 1695 (sale of his
official influence) ; Earl of Portland in 1701; Earl of Oxford in 1701 (conversion of royal
funds and property, and giving false advice to the King); Lord Somers, Lord Chancellor
of England, in 1701 (giving false advice to the King and unlawfully affixing the Great Seal
to treaties and commissions); Lord Halifax, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 1701 (cor-
ruption in misusing Crown assets); Earl of Strafford in 1715 (acting to the detriment of
the nation in wartime by consorting with the enemy); Warren Hastings in 1786 (mis-
government and maladministration in India); Lord Viscount Nelville, Treasurer of the
Royal Navy, in 1806 (misappropriation of public funds). Id. at 111-90.
"[Iun applying the term 'high crimes and misdemeanors' to the conduct of English judges,
[the Commons] only included in that category such acts as a judge performs while sitting
upon the bench, administering the laws of the realm . . . . Excepting bribery, there is no
case in the Parliamentary law of England which gives color to the idea that the personal
misconduct of a judge, in matters outside of his administration of the law in a court of
justice, was ever considered or charged to constitute an impeachable high crime and mis-
demeanor." Taylor, The American Law of Impeachment, 180 N. Am. Rev. 502, 506 (1905)
(emphasis deleted). See Dwight, supra note 29, at 264, concluding that the "weight of
authority is, that no impeachment will lie except for a true crime, or, in other words, for a
breach of the common or statute law .... "
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The most famous English impeachment proceeding was initiated three
days before the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia. On
May 11, 1787, the House of Commons impeached Warren Hastings at
the bar of the House of Lords for "high crimes and misdemeanors."
Hastings had served as Governor-General of India for a period of thirteen
years. He "had ruled an extensive and populous country, had made laws
and treaties, had sent forth armies, had set up and pulled down princes"1
-all in his official capacity. The articles of impeachment charged him
with mismanagement and misgovernment in India, including acts of
extortion, bribery, corruption, confiscation of property, and mistreatment
of various provinces ° Some of the articles were poorly drafted and were
criticized for not charging criminal conductY4 Notwithstanding this de-
fect, the House of Commons instructed Edmund Burke, who had vowed
in 1783 to bring Hastings "to justice,"' to impeach him "at the bar of
the House of Lords. 4 The trial began in 1788,1 and resulted in an
acquittal on all charges in 1795!1
Impeachment, however, was only one of several procedures which were
available at the common law for removing judges.!G From the earliest
39. Maculay's Essay on Warren Hastings 175 (M. Frick ed. 1900) [hereinafter cited
as Macaulay].
40. See 3 G. Gleig, Memoirs of Warren Hastings 283-85 (1841) [hereinafter cited as
Gleig]; P. Marshall, The Impeachment of Warren Hastings (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Marshall].
41. Marshall 56-58.
42. Id. at 19-20.
43. Id. at 58.
44. Gleig 332-33; Macaulay 171-78; L. Trotter, Warren Hastings 234-37 (1910). After
two days of reading the charges and answers, Burke then consumed four days with his
opening speech. He concluded by stating: "I impeach Warren Hastings of high crimes and
misdemeanors. I impeach him in the name of the Commons' .... the English nation ....
the people of India .... in the name of human nature itself .... I impeach the common
enemy and oppressor of all!" Macaulay 179-80.
45. Marshall 85. Early in the trial a dispute between the Managers and the defense
arose as to whether, in deciding the case, the Lords were bound either by the laws of
Parliament or by the laws as observed in other courts. They resolved that they "intended
to follow contemporary legal practice rather than seventeenth century precedents." Id. at
64, 69.
46. When judges were appointed during good behavior, the means available for their
removal were: "In cases of misconduct not extending to a legal misdemeanour, the appro-
priate course appears to be by scire fadas to repeal his patent, 'good behaviour' being the
condition precedent of the judges' tenure; secondly, when the conduct amounts to what a
court might consider a misdemeanour, then by information; thirdly, if it amounts to actual
crime, then by impeachment; fourthly, and in all cases, at the discretion of Parliament,
'by the joint exercise of the inquisitorial and judicial jurisdiction' conferred upon both
Houses by statute, when they proceed to consider of the expediency of addressing the
crown for the removal of a judge." 2 A. Todd, On Parliamentary Government in England
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days, judges were appointed by the Crown and given "patents" which
fixed their terms.47 The usual term was durante bene placito, i.e., at the
pleasure of the Crown.48 This term expired on the death of the king.40
Because of their method of appointment and uncertain tenure, their
loyalty was to the Crown. Henry VII (1485-1509) is said to have boasted
to the effect that he ruled England with his laws, and his laws with his
judges.6
Since a judge's tenure was dependent upon the pleasure of the Crown,
his removal was quite simple: 1 The king had merely to revoke his
patent.5 '2 This was done on a number of occasions when a judge's actions
displeased the Crown. Thus, for example, in 1616 Sir Edward Coke was
dismissed by James I because of his stand in favor of the independence
of the judiciary and the rule of law. 3 In 1628, Charles I sought to remove
Sir John Walter, Chief Judge of the Exchequer, for his opinion that no
criminal proceeding could be brought against a member of Parliament
for an act done in either House. Claiming that his patent was for good
behavior and not at the pleasure of the Crown, Judge Walter resisted the
king's efforts to remove him and demanded a scire facias in court to
728-29 (1869) (emphasis deleted and footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Todd]. See
also 6 Halsbury 609.
47. See Haynes 76-77; 0. Phillips, A First Book of English Law 23 (5th ed. 1965). A
patent has been defined as a "grant by the sovereign to a subject . . .under the great seal,
conferring some authority, title, franchise, or property." Black's Law Dictionary 1282 (4th
rev. ed. 1968).
48. See Haynes 62-67; Plucknett 465.
49. Haynes 54-55; Plucknett 466. Even after the passage in 1701 of the Act of Settle-
ment, which provided for a term during good behavior, judicial commissions continued to
expire upon the King's death. In 1720 the commissions were extended to six months after
the King's death. Finally, in 1761 it was provided by statute that commissions survive the
death of the King. Haynes 54-55; Todd 726.
50. Haynes 55.
51. See Cross & Hall 224; H. Hanbury, English Courts of Law 127 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Hanburyl; 2 Taylor 239-42.
52. "[Mlanipulations of the bench were possible because judges were ordinarily ap-
pointed durante bene placito and were thus removable at pleasure without assigning any
professional default." Plucknett 465.
53. Id. Coke was responsible for the judges of the exchequer refusing to consult with
the King prior to rendering their decision in the "case of Commendams." When cbastized
by James I for this position, Coke alone defended their refusal. He was then dismissed.
When asked "whether in a like case in future he would consult with the king before ren-
dering judgment, in the event his majesty should consider himself interested, nothing more
could be drawn from him than the statement that when such a case should arise, he would
do what was fitting for a judge to do." 2 Taylor 241; see Plucknett 349-52.
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determine his right to continue in office." Charles chose instead to pro-
hibit the judge from sitting in court. 5
Removal by the Crown continued until the eighteenth century. Finally,
in 1701, Parliament passed the Act of Settlement, which provided that
"judges' commissions be made quamdiu se bene gesserint [during good
behavior], and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the
address of both Houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove them."5 0
After their tenure was changed to "good behavior," judges no longer
were removable at the king's will or fancy. 7 "Address" by both Houses
of Parliament was established as a means of removal. 8 It could be em-
ployed for practically any reason whatsoever, which meant that its use
54. The writ of "scire facias" was used to revoke a patent after a determination was
made that the holder had breached the condition upon which he held office, eg., good be-
havior. Blackstone states that "where the patentee hath done an act that amounts to a
forfeiture of the grant, the remedy to repeal the patent is by writ of 'sdre facias' in
chancery." 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 256 (Christian & Archbald ed. 1825). In Eng-
land the writ survived until 1947, when it was abolished by the Crown Proceedings Act.
0. Phillips, supra note 47, at 24 n.5. Interestingly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
after abolishing the writ, state: "Relief heretofore available by . . . scire facias may be
obtained by appropriate action . ..under the practice prescribed in these rules." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 81(b).
55. See Haynes 61-62; McIlwain, The Tenure of English Judges, 7 Am. PoL Sd. Rev.
217, 221 (1913). In 1672, Sir John Archer, a judge of the common pleas who had been
appointed for good behavior, refused to surrender his patent without a "scire fadas." Al-
though Charles II directed him to cease exercising his duties, he continued to do so. Id.
at 223.
56. 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 at 360 (1701). For the text of the Act, see Plucknett
460-66; 2 Taylor 422-23. The Act did not take effect until after the death of Queen Anne
in 1714. See Haynes 78; Plucknett 464. Section 8 of the Act confirmed Parliament's de-
cision in the impeachment of Earl Thomas Osborne of Danby that the King's pardon was
not a defense to an impeachment by the Commons. See Plucknett 464, 532-34.
57. "The grant of an office during good behaviour creates an office for life determinable
upon breach of the condition, and behaviour means behaviour in matters concerning the
office, except in the case of conviction upon an indictment for any infamous offence of
such a nature as to render the person unfit to exercise the office, which amounts legally
to misbehaviour though not committed in connection with the office.
"Misbehaviour as to the office itself means improper exercise of the functions appertain-
ing to the office, or non-attendance, or neglect of or refusal to perform the duties of the
office." 6 Halsbury 609-10 (footnotes omitted). Accord, Todd 727.
58. Address is a formal request by Parliament to the King seeking the dismissal of a
judge whose conduct, while wrongful, fails to warrant an impeachment trial. Sce Black's
Law Dictionary 60 (4th ed. 1951). Address afforded the two Houses of Parliament "a right
to appeal to the crown for the removal of a judge who has, in their opinion, proved him-
self unfit for the proper exercise of his judicial office." Todd 729.
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depended on the conscience of Parliament. 0 However, unlike impeach-
ment, address was not used in the period between 1701 and 1787.00
B. Colonial Antecedents
1. Pre-1776
During colonial America, executive and judicial officials usually served
for an uncertain term. In the royal colonies governors were appointed by
the Crown, and in the proprietary colonies by the proprietor (subject to
ratification by the Crown after the seventeenth century). Both royal and
proprietary governors served at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
They received a commission, which was a formal but brief statement of
their authority, from the Crown or proprietor. The manner in which they
executed that authority was delineated in another document known as
the "instructions.!' "6 There are a number of instances during colonial
59. See W. Carpenter, judicial Tenure in the United States 125 (1918). Upon an ad-
dress by both houses, the Crown was bound by convention to comply with the request.
0. Phillips, The Constitutional Law of Great Britain and the Commonwealth 445 (1952).
"If there is a failure in the administration of justice, from whatever cause, affecting any
judge, both Houses of Parliament may address the crown, to remove that judge from
office." 1 Todd 355.
60. This procedure was used in 1830 against Sir Jonah Barrington, judge of the Court
of Admiralty in Ireland, for allegedly appropriating funds belonging to the court. 62 Lords
Journ. 599 (1830); A. Gibb, judicial Corruption in the United Kingdom 64, 72 (1957).
While address was instituted on other occasions, Barrington's case is the only Instance
where it was carried to a final conclusion. 6 Halsbury 610-11 nn.d, e & h. Removal by
address under the Act of Settlement was first considered in 1805 when Parliament investi-
gated the judicial misconduct of judge Fox, with a view toward a possible address to the
King. Between 1805 and 1867 historian Alpheus Todd records eight instances where a
possible address was considered by Parliament. Only in 1830 was it brought to a conclusion
when the sovereign, regretting the circumstances giving rise to the address, ordered Bar-
rington removed from office. The only restraints on the employment of address were those
Parliament, in exercising its position of trust, chose to impose upon Itself. Todd, after
reviewing available precedents, found six self-imposed "rules" on the utilization of address:
The complaint originated in the House of Commons; the complaint could be Initiated in
various ways (e.g., by a member, a royal commission or even an individual wronged by
the judge); members had to investigate the charges before Parliament decided to Investi-
gate; an investigation looking toward an address was only to be taken up if the alleged
misconduct justified removal; the accused had to be informed of the charges and given an
opportunity to present a defense, and the address to the sovereign had to state the miscon-
duct which in Parliament's opinion rendered the judge unfit for office, so the King might
exercise "constitutional discretion" in acting on the request. 2 Todd 729-44.
61. For a description of the various documents of government used during the colonial
period, see L. Labaree, Royal Government in America 1-36 (1930) [hereinafter cited as
Labaree].
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America of governors being recalled for disobedience or inefficiency, or
because of politics or patronage in England.
0 2
Judges, on the other hand, were in some cases commissioned in En-
gland, and in other instances appointed by the governors under authority
contained in the instructions. 3 During most of the colonial period these
instructions were ambiguous as to the tenure which judges were to enjoy.
They directed the governors not to express "any limitation of time" in any
judicial commissions, apparently to protect judges from arbitrary removal
by the governors. 4 It was not clear, however, whether the expression "no
limitation of time" meant during good behavior or during the pleasure of
the Crown. Up until the first third of the eighteenth century governors
construed the expression, and so issued judicial commissions, as meaning
during the Crown's pleasure. 5 A number of cases then occurred in which
governors issued commissions to judges during good behavior.,, As a re-
sult, in 1752 the authorities in England revised the instructions to the
governors, making it clear that judicial commissions were to be issued
during the pleasure of the Crown. 7 What followed was a period of strife
in some of the colonies, involving the authorities in England, governors,
and the colonial legislative bodies. Some legislatures refused to appropri-
ate funds for the payment of judges' salaries unless they were issued
commissions during good behavior. This put governors in a difficult posi-
tion, because to issue such commissions they had to violate the terms of
their instructions.68 The British position on tenure, however, ultimately
prevailed until the American Revolution.
That judges were rendered insecure in their positions was listed in the
Declaration of Independence as one of the ways by which the king sought
to establish an absolute tyranny over the states: "He has made Judges
62. Id. at 125-26.
63. 0. Dickerson, American Colonial Government 1696-1765, at 197 (1912) [hereinafter
cited as Dickerson].
64. A typical instruction provided: "You shall not displace any of the judges, justices,
or other officers or ministers within our said province, without good and sufficient cause
to be signified unto us, and to our said commissioners for trade and plantations; and to
prevent arbitrary removals of judges and justices of the peace, you shall not express any
limitation of time in the commissions you are to grant." Id. at 195 & n.445. See also Labare
381 n.20, 388-89.
65. Dickerson 196; Labaree 389-90.
66. Dickerson 199.
67. Id. at 208.
68. See id. at 200-09. In 1759, Pennsylvania passed a law providing for judges to hold
their tenure during good behavior and establishing address by the assembly as a procedure
for removal This act was rejected by the British Government. Simlar legislation was
passed in Jamaica in 1751 and proposed in New York in 1761. Labaree 390-91.
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dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount
and payment of their salaries."
2. 1776-1787
The first state constitutions which were adopted drew on the common
law traditions and the experience of a century and a half of colonial gov-
ernment. Provision was made in each state for a chief executive, a legis-
lature and a judiciary. 9 A bicameral legislature existed in all but two of
the states.10 In eight states the executive was chosen by the legislature,"'
and in most states his term of office was limited to one year. Regarding
the judiciary, a number of constitutions contained provisions providing
that certain judges held office during good behavior.72
Almost all of the early state constitutions contained provisions for im-
peachment of officials, although the grounds for impeachment varied.
Some state constitutions authorized impeachment where the safety of the
state was "endangered" by "mal-administration, corruption or other
means.; 73 Other constitutions authorized impeachment for "misconduct
and mal-administration" in office, 4 "mal and corrupt conduct" in office, 0
"misbehaviour,"70  "mal-administration,; 7 7  and "misdemeanor or de-
fault.178 In most states the lower house of the legislature was empowered
to institute impeachment proceedings.79
69. The colonial charters and early state constitutions are reproduced in B. Poore, The
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of the United
States (2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter cited as Poore's Constitutions].
70. Georgia became bicameral in 1789 and Pennsylvania in 1790.
71. He was elected by the people in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York and Rhode Island. In all of these states except New York, he was chosen by the
legislature if he did not obtain a majority of the popular vote.
72. See, e.g., 1 Poore's Constitutions 275 (Del. Const. (1776)); id. at 826 (Md. Const.
(1776)); id. at 968 (Mass. Const. (1780)); 2 id. at 1286 (N.H. Const. (1784)); id. at 1336
(N.Y. Const. (1777)); id. at 1412 (N.C. Const. (1776)); id. at 1625 (S.C. Const. (1778));
and id. at 1911 (Va. Const. (1776)).
73. See I id. at 276-77 (Del. Const. (1776)); 2 id. at 1912 (Va. Const. (1776)). The
North Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided that officers offending the state through
violation of any part of the state constitution, "maladministration," or "corruption" were
subject to impeachment. 1 id. at 1413.
74. 1 id. at 963 (Mass. Const. (1780)); 2 id. at 1286 (N.H. Const. (1784)).
75. 2 id. at 1337 (N.Y. Const. (1777)); id. at 1624 (S.C. Const. (1778)).
76. 1 id. at 819 (Md. Const. (1776)); 2 id. at 1312 (N.J. Const. (1776)).
77. 2 id. at 1545 (Pa. Const. (1776)).
78. 1 id. at 254 (Conn. Charter (1662)); 2 id. at 1599 (Providence Plantations Charter
(1663)).
79. Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Virginia all provided for impeachment in this manner. 1 id. at 276,
964, 1287, 1312; 2 id. at 1337, 1413, 1624, 1912. In New York and South Carolina, a two.
thirds vote was required for impeachment.
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The forum for trying impeachment proceedings varied. In some states
the trial was by the upper house of the legislature; 0 in others, by the
judiciary; 1 and in still others, by a combination of these forums.,,
Some state constitutions specified the punishment on impeachment to be
removal from office and disqualification from holding office in the future,
with the provision that the officer was also subject to indictment and other
penalties imposed by law." Additionally, some constitutions provided that
the chief executive could not grant a pardon in cases of impeachment.
Aside from impeachment, a number of state constitutions also provided,
in the case of judges, for the British system of removal by the address of
the legislature.85
At the national level, the Articles of Confederation, which had become
effective in 1781, constituted the basic charter of government. It provided
for a Congress in which each state had one vote, with the assent of nine
being required for important decisions. The Articles severely limited the
powers of Congress and completely failed to provide for a national judi-
ciary or chief executive. 0 Nowhere did it contain any impeachment pro-
visions.
C. Constitutional Convention of 1787
The debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 clearly reveal
that the delegates were familiar with the colonial charters, early state
constitutions, and common law traditions and precedents, and were
knowledgeable in the various forms of government. This background par-
ticularly influenced them in formulating the impeachment provisions of
the Constitution.
On May 29, 1787, four days after the Convention opened, Edmund
Randolph of Virginia presented the fifteen resolutions of his state's plan,
80. E.g., Delaware, New Hampshire and New Jersey. Id. at 276, 1286, 1312.
81. E.g., North Carolina and V7irginia. 2 id. at 1413, 1912.
82. In New York and South Carolina, a two-thirds vote was required. Id. at 1337, 1624.
83. This was true in Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York and Virginia
1 id. at 275, 963, 1286; 2 id. at 1337, 1912.
84. This limitation was imposed in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania.
1 id. at 966, 1285; 2 id. at 1545.
85. E.g., Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. 1 id. at 276,
969, 1290; 2 id. at 1625. In Maryland, a two-thirds vote of both houses was required. 1 id.
at 819. In Pennsylvania, judges were removable for "misbehavior" at any time. 2 id. at
1545. Delaware also provided for removal of officers on "conviction of misbehavior at
common law .... " I id. at 276.
86. In 1786 it was proposed that the Articles be amended to provide, among other
things, for a federal court to try and punish all officers appointed by Congress for "all
crimes, offenses and misbehavior in their offices." See H. Hockett, The Constitutional His-
tory of the United States 1776-1826, at 186 (1939).
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commonly known as the Virginia Plan. This plan, largely the handiwork
of James Madison, called for the creation of a strong national government
consisting of an executive, a two-house legislature, and a judiciary. The
executive, whose term was not specified, was to be elected by the national
legislature and was not to be eligible for re-election. The judiciary was to
consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be
chosen by the national legislature, to hold their offices during "good be-
haviour."' It was to have jurisdiction of, inter alia, "impeachments of any
National officers .... 2 The Virginia Plan, however, did not specify any
grounds for impeachment.
On the same day that the Virginia Plan was introduced, Charles Pinck-
ney of South Carolina proposed his plan of government. Although the
original of his plan has never been located, it is believed to have provided
for a tripartite system of government. The power of impeachment was
lodged in the lower house of the legislature and the trial was assigned to
the federal judiciary.89
On May 30, the Convention resolved itself into a Committee of the
Whole to discuss the Virginia Plan point by point. On the following day a
discussion ensued as to the executive article of the Virginia Plan. During
this discussion Gunning Bedford, Jr., of Delaware, opposed a long term,
stating that a chief executive might prove to be incapable of discharging
his duties. "An impeachment ... would be no cure for this evil, as an
impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity."' 0 Randolph
felt a plural executive was desirable in part because one "can not [sic] be
impeached until the expiration of his Office, or he will be dependent on
the Legislature .... 2
On June 2, John Dickinson of Delaware proposed that the executive be
made removable by the national legislature on the request of a majority
of the legislatures of the individual states."2 He said that "he did not like
the plan of impeaching the Great Officers of State." George Mason of
Virginia observed that "[s]ome mode of displacing an unfit magistrate
87. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21-22 (Farrand ed. 1911 & 1937)
[hereinafter cited as Farrand].
88. Id. at 22.
89. One copy of his plan, which was transmitted to John Quincy Adams in 1818 by
Pinckney himself, referred to "Treason, Bribery or Corruption" as the grounds for presi-
dential impeachment. 3 Farrand 600. Upon seeing this copy, Madison questioned Its ac-
curacy. Id. at 601-02. A reconstructed copy of the plan (see id. at 604) prepared by certain
scholars refers to "all Crimes . . . in their Offices" as the grounds for impeachment of
officers of the United States. Id. at 608.
90. 1 id. at 69.
91. Id. at 71.
92. Id. at 85.
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is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well
as by the corruptibility of the man chosen.1103 Wilson and Madison ob-
jected to Dickinson's proposal, declaring that "it would enable a minority
of the people to prevent [the] removal of an officer who had rendered him-
self justly criminal in the eyes of a majority .... "I Hugh Williamson of
North Carolina then moved to add to the executive article the words "to
be removeable [sic] on impeachment and conviction of mal-practice or
neglect of duty .... I'l This motion, seconded by William R. Davie of
North Carolina, carried.
During the next week, the delegates devoted some time to the judicial
article. James Wilson of Pennsylvania suggested that judges be appointed
by the President. Madison, however, felt that appointment should be by
the Senate. On June 13, Randolph and Madison successfully moved the
adoption of a resolution which placed "impeachments of any national
officers" within the jurisdiction of the judiciary 0 That same day the
Committee reported out the Virginia Plan, as amended. Among other
things, it provided that the chief executive was to be elected by the
national legislature for a seven year term, and that judges were to be
appointed by the upper house and to hold their term during good be-
havior. The impeachment provisions consisted of those agreed to on June
2, and earlier on June 13.
On June 14, discussion of the Virginia Plan was postponed at the re-
quest of William Patterson of New Jersey. On the following day Patter-
son presented nine resolutions (the New Jersey Plan), under which there
was to be a unicameral legislature (in which each state was to have one
vote), a supreme court, and a plural executive elected by Congress. The
executive was to be removable by Congress on application by a majority
of the state executives and was not to be eligible for another term. The
Supreme Court was to be appointed by the President, to hold their offices
during good behavior, and "to hear & determine in the first instance on
all impeachments of federal officers .... "
Three days later Alexander Hamilton presented a sketch of his plan of
government, which was patterned after the British Government. "[H]e
had no scruple in declaring... that the British Govt. was the best in the
world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do
in America.""' Under Hamilton's Plan, the chief executive, senators, and
93. Id. at 86.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 88.
96. Id. at 232.
97. Id. at 244.
98. Id. at 288.
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judges were to serve during good behavior. The chief executive, senators
and "all officers of the United States [were] to be liable to impeachment
for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon conviction to be removed from
office, & disqualified for holding any place of trust or profit . ... "I'
Impeachments were to be tried by a court the composition of which is
not clear. 00
On June 19, after considering the Patterson resolutions, the Committee
of the Whole reaffirmed its action on the Virginia Plan. The subject of
impeachment did not come up again at the Convention until July 18,
during a discussion on the method of appointing judges. During the de-
bate, Mason observed that the method might depend on the mode of
trying impeachments of the executive, since if the judges try impeach-
ment, they ought not be appointed by the executive. 110 Gouverneur Morris
of Pennsylvania suggested that a trial of a President's impeachment by
the judiciary would likely involve intrigue between the legislative branch
and the judges, thereby frustrating an impartial trial. At some point
during the debate it was unanimously agreed to strike out of the judicial
resolution the words "impeachments of national Officers."'1 2
On July 20, the delegates engaged in an extensive debate as to whether
the President should be subject to impeachment. Pinckney and Morris
moved to eliminate from the amended Virginia Plan the clause providing
for the President's removal. In opposition, Mason argued that impeach-
ment was necessary. "When great crimes were committed he was for
punishing the principal as well as the Coadjutors. 10 3 Davie, Franklin,
Madison, Gerry, Randolph and Wilson were also of the view that im-
peachment was necessary. Davie considered it "an essential security for
the good behaviour of the Executive."'104 In Franklin's opinion, history
showed that where there has been no means of removal of an executive,
there has been recourse to assassinations. 00 Madison stated that it was
"indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the
Community [against] the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief
Magistrate."'0 0 Madison remarked that the President "might pervert
his administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He might
99. Id. at 292.
100. One copy of Hamilton's plan specified the forum as a court consisting of the justices
of the Supreme Court plus the chief or senior judge of each state. Another copy confined
the court to state judges. See 3 id. at 618-19.
101. 2 id. at 41-42.
102. Id. at 39. The good behavior tenure provision was unanimously agreed to. Id. at 38.
103. Id. at 65.
104. Id. at 64.




betray his trust to foreign powers."' 0 7 "In the case of the Executive
Magistracy," said Madison, "loss of capacity or corruption was more
within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be
fatal to the Republic."108 Said Randolph: "Guilt wherever found ought
to be punished. The Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing
his power; particularly in time of war when the military force, and in
some respects the public money, will be in his hands. Should no regular
punishment be provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults &
insurrections."'0 9 King expressed the opinion that impeachment was not
appropriate in the case of an officer who served for a fixed term. It was
appropriate, he said, in the case of the judiciary, since they hold their
offices during good behavior. He stated that " [i] t is necessary therefore
that a forum should be established for trying misbehaviour.' 10 King
added that since the President was to serve for a limited term, he would
periodically be tried for his behavior by his electors" and "he ought to
be subject to no intermediate trial, by impeachment."" Near the end of
the debate Morris changed his view and argued for impeachment, assert-
ing that it was necessary for cases of bribery, treachery, corruption and
incapacity." Following the debate the Convention, by a vote of eight to
two, agreed to the clause providing for the President's removal for "mal-
practice or neglect of duty.""
3
On July 23, a Committee of Detail was organized to prepare and report
a Constitution in conformance with the proceedings held up until that
time." 4 On July 24, the Committee of the Whole was discharged and the
various plans of government were referred to the Committee of Detail;
on July 26, the Convention reaffirmed the provision that the President
107. Madison also noted that the executive was different from the legidative branch,
stating: "It could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the members of an Assem-
bly would either lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust."
He added that the "difficulty of acting in concert for purposes of corruption was a zecurity
to the public." Id. at 66.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 67.
110. Id.
ill. Id.
112. Id. at 68-69. Earlier in the debate Morris said that corruption and "some few other
offences . . . ought to be impeachable; but . .. the cases ought to be enumerated & de-
fined." Id. at 65.
113. Id. at 61, 69. No decision was reached as to the forum for trying impeachments.
Pinckney, King and Randolph urged that the legislature not be involved, since otherwise
the President's independence would be sharply curtailed.
114. Id. at 95. Its members were John Rutledge of South Carolina, Edmund Randolph
of Virginia, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, and
James Wilson of Pennsylvania. Id. at 97.
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shall be "removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or
neglect of duty;""' 5 and on July 27, the Convention adjourned so that
the Committee of Detail could draft its report.
The Committee presented its report on August 6. Article IV of its
report provided that the House of Representatives "shall have the sole
power of impeachment."" 06 Article X, the executive article, provided that
the President "shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the
House of Representatives, and conviction in the Supreme Court, of
treason, bribery, or corruption.""7 Article XI, the judicial article, gave
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction of "the trial of impeachments
of Officers of the United States .... "118
The Committee's report was the subject of discussion for the next five
weeks. On August 9, the Convention agreed to the clause giving the House
the sole power of impeachment."" On August 20, a number of resolutions
concerning the organization of the executive branch were proposed by
Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney, and referred to the Committee
of Detail. These resolutions called for the appointment of various execu-
tive officers who were to "be liable to impeachment and removal from
office for neglect of duty malversation, [sic] or corruption.' 120 Gerry then
moved that the Committee devise a method for trying judges in cases of
impeachment. Two days later the Committee returned with the following
addition to the good behavior provision of Article XI, Section 2: "The
Judges of the Supreme Court shall be triable by the Senate, on impeach-
ment by the House of Representatives .... ,,12
On August 25, the Convention adopted a provision excluding cases of
impeachment from the President's power to grant reprieves and par-
dons. 22 On August 27, the Convention postponed consideration of the
impeachment provision at the request of Gouverneur Morris, who thought
that the Supreme Court was an improper tribunal, "particularly, if the
115. Id. at 116.
116. Id. at 178-79.
117. Id. at 185-86. The "treason, bribery, or corruption" language appears to have been
taken from a document in the handwriting of Edmund Randolph. Id. at 137 & n. 6.
118. Id. at 186. Section 4 of this article provided that there was to be no jury in Im-
peachment cases. Section 5 provided that the judgment in cases of impeachment "shall
not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
office of honour, trust or profit, under the United States. But the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgement and punishment according
to law." Section 2 of Article XI provided that judges of the Supreme Court and of the
inferior courts would hold their offices during good behavior. Id. at 186.
119. Id. at 231.
120. Id. at 344.
121. Id. at 367.
122. Id. at 411.
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first judge was to be of the [P] rivy Council."m Dickinson then moved to
-add, after the good behavior provision in the judicial article, the following
qualification: "[P]rovided that they may be removed by the Executive
on the application [of] the Senate and House of Representatives."'" 4
Gerry seconded the motion. Morris argued against it, on the theory that
it was contradictory to "say that the Judges should hold their offices dur-
ing good behavior, and yet be [removable] without a trial." In his opin-
ion, "it was fundamentally wrong to subject Judges to so arbitrary an
authority." Sherman disagreed, noting that a similar provision was con-
tained in the British statutes. He felt that there was no impropriety if
the provisions "were made part of the Constitutional regulation of the
Judiciary establishment."11 Wilson remarked that such a provision was
less dangerous in the British statutes because it was unlikely that the
House of Lords and House of Commons would concur on the same occa-
sions. "The Judges would be in a bad situation," in Wilson's view, "if
made to depend on every gust of faction which might prevail in the two
branches of our [Government]."'" Rutledge and Randolph also noted
their objections to the provision. Randolph felt that it weakens "too
much the independence of the Judges."' " On the motion, only the state
of Connecticut voted for it. It was opposed by seven states.
On the following day the Convention adopted the provision that the
judgment in cases of impeachment would not extend further than to
removal from office and disqualification to hold office in the future.?2 On
August 31, a number of matters were referred to a Committee of Eleven
which was commissioned to report on those parts of the Constitution that
had been postponed or not acted upon. On September 4, David Brearley
of New Hampshire, the chairman of the Committee, presented a partial
report." 9 Among other things, this report called for the creation of an
office of Vice President and proposed an electoral college method of elect-
ing the President. In the area of impeachment, it provided that the Senate
123. Id. at 427.
124. Id. at 428.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 429. Wilson noted that Chief Justice Holt "had successively offended by his
independent conduct, both houses of Parliament. Had this happened at the same time, he
would have been ousted." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 435. It is interesting to note that also that day the words "high misdemeanor"
were eliminated from the extradition provisions of Article XV and the words "other crime
substituted---"it being doubtful whether 'high misdemeanor' had not a technical meaning
too limited." Id. at 443. The expression "high misdemeanors" was also referred to by Rufus
King during the debate concerning a definition of treason. King stated that treason against
particular states could be punishable by such states as h misdemeanors." Id. at 348.
129. Id. at 497-99.
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would have the power to try all impeachments, with a, two-thirds vote
required for conviction. The Vice-President was to be ex officio President
of the Senate, except when the President was tried, in which event the
Chief Justice was to preside. The grounds for conviction of the President
were limited to "treason or bribery."
In presenting his own and the Committee's reasons for the creation of
the electoral college, Morris stated that it was difficult to find a body other
than the Senate to try impeachment cases. °30 He thought that "[a] con-
clusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the
Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after
the trial of the impeachment.'
131
On September 8, the impeachment provisions were taken up by the
Convention. Mason opened the discussion by questioning the limitation
of impeachment to cases of treason and bribery. He felt that "[t] reason
as defined in the Constitution [would] not reach many great and danger-
ous offences." He further was of the opinion that "[a] ttempts to subvert
the Constitution [might] not be Treason as... defined" and that, since
"bills of attainder ... are forbidden," the power of impeachment should
be extended. 3s Mason then moved to add "maladministration" as a
ground for impeachment. Gerry seconded the motion. Madison objected
that "[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure
of the Senate." Mason thereupon withdrew the expression and substituted
"other high Crimes & Misdemeanors against the State."'118 The motion
carried without any discussion of the new phrase. The expression "against
the State" was immediately changed to "against the United States."
Madison then directed his attention to the Senate as the forum for
trying impeachments. He objected to this forum because the President
"was to be impeached by the other branch of the Legislature, and for
any act which might be called a misdemeasnor [sic]. ' " Under these
circumstances, he said, the President was made "improperly dependent."
Madison suggested the Supreme Court as either the forum or part of a
forum. Gouverneur Morris argued for the Senate, believing that "there
could be no danger that the Senate would say untruly on their oaths that
the President was guilty of crimes ..... The Supreme Court, he thought,
130. Id. at 500. This was one of the reasons why Congress was rejected as the body to
elect the President. It apparently was felt that if Congress had the power to elect, It should
not have the power to impeach.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 550. Mason noted that Hastings' actions would not have been deemed trea-
son as defined.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 551.
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"might be warped or corrupted.' 35 Pinckney also spoke out against the
Senate, stating that its use would make the President too dependent upon
the legislature. Williamson, on the other hand, felt the Senate would be
too lenient because of its sharing of various powers with the President,
while Roger Sherman of Connecticut asserted that the Supreme Court
was improper because the President appointed its members.13 0 Madison's
motion to eliminate the Senate was decisively rejected. The Convention
then added to the impeachment provision that "'[t]he vice-President
and other Civil officers of the U.S. shall be removed from office on
impeachment and conviction as aforesaid.' ,,137 Another addition was that
the Senate would take an oath in an impeachment case.
A committee was then formed to revise the style of and arrange the
articles, but without power to effect substantive changes. On September
12, the Committee returned a draft which, except for a few changes, was
to become the Constitution. 38 One change made was the elimination of
the words "against the United States" from the "high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors" expression. On September 14, Rutledge and Morris moved
to amend the impeachment provisions to require that "persons impeached
be suspended from their office until they be tried and acquitted.13  Madi-
son objected on the grounds that this would make the President even
more dependent upon the legislature, since one branch would be able to
effect his temporary removal. The motion was defeated by a vote of eight
to three.140 Three days later the Constitution was signed, with the im-
peachment provisions as they stand today.
D. Ratifying Conventions
Post-Convention discussion of the impeachment provisions was not
extensive. One of the principal references in The Federalist occurs in num-
ber seventy-nine where, in commenting on the provision dealing with the
compensation for judges, Hamilton stated:
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting
impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of
Representatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from
office, and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the point
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 552.
138. With respect to that draft, Mason noted that there was an inconsistency between
Article I, Section 3 and Article II, Section 4, in that the latter section did not mandate dis-
qualification from holding office in the future in the event of a conviction on impeachment.
Id. at 637.
139. Id. at 612.
140. Id. at 612-13.
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which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is
the only one which we find in our Constitution in respect to our own judges.
The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability has been
a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible that such a provision
would either not be practiced upon or would be more liable to abuse than calculated
to answer any good purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of the mind has, I
believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts. An attempt to fix the boundary be-
tween the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal
and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public
good. The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbitrary;
and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to
be a virtual disqualification. 141
In The Federalist number sixty-five, where Hamilton gave the reasons
for the Senate being chosen as the forum for trying impeachments, he
stated:
The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct
of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust.
They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL,
as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.142
Hamilton went on to say that in England and in several states, the prac-
tice of impeachments was regarded "as a bridle in the hands of the legis-
lative body upon the executive servants of the government."' 43
The impeachment provisions received some attention in the state ratify-
ing conventions. Much of it centered on whether the Senate would convict
persons to whose appointment it had consented, whether members of
Congress were impeachable, whether the states could impeach state
officers, and on the desirability of lodging the power of impeachment in
the Congress. Some statements were made, however, which give a clue as
to the understanding of the framers. In the Virginia ratifying convention,
Edmund Randolph declared that "[i] n England, those subjects which pro-
duce impeachments are not opinions .... It would be impossible to dis-
cover whether the error in opinion resulted from a willful mistake of the
heart, or an involuntary fault of the head."'144 In North Carolina, Gov-
ernor Samuel Johnston, who was to become the state's first Senator,
asserted that "[i]mpeachment only extends to high crimes and misde-
meanors in a public office. It is a mode of trial pointed out for great
misdemeanors against the public."' 45 William MacLaine observed that
members of Congress, while not impeachable, were "amenable to the law
141. 2 The Federalist No. 79, at 108-09 (Tudor Pub. Co. ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
142. Id. No. 6S, at 17.
143. Id. at 18.
144. 3 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 401 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as Elliot).
14S. 4 id. at 48.
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for crimes and misdemeanors committed as individuals."1 40 James Iredell,
the principal advocate of ratification in his state, stated that the power
of impeachment was designed "to bring great offenders to punishment."
"It is calculated," he said, "to bring them to punishment for crime which
it is not easy to describe, but which everyone must be convinced is a
high crime and misdemeanor against the government .... [T] he occasion
for its exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the community, and
the objects of it may be such as cannot be easily reached by an ordinary
tribunal.' 47 He also noted that an official who is impeached might be
liable for common law punishment if the offense "be punishable by that
law."M 48
In the First Congress, during a debate regarding the advisability of
empowering the President to remove public officers, Madison stated:
The danger, then, consists in this: The President can displace from office a man whose
merits require that he should be continued in it. What will be the motives which the
President can feel for such abuse of his power and the restraints that operate to pre-
vent it? In the first place, he will be impeachable by this House before the Senate for
such an act of maladmini trtion; for I contend that the wanton removal of meritori-
ous officers would subject him to impeachment and removal from his own high trust.1 40
III. HIsToRY OF AmRICAN IMTEAC ENT
In the 181-year history of the United States, there have been only
twelve cases of impeachment at the federal level.'8 0 Eleven of these re-
sulted in Senate trials, but only four ultimately resulted in conviction
and removal. Among those impeached have been a President, a Senator,
a Supreme Court Justice, a Cabinet member, a federal circuit court of
appeals judge, and seven federal district court judges. An account of
these impeachments follows. Since a proper understanding of the prece-
dents, particularly the significance of the votes, is not possible without
reference to the precise nature of the articles of impeachment themselves,
the articles are summarized in detail in this section.
A. William Blount
On July 3, 1797, the United States House of Representatives received
a confidential message from President John Adams regarding the conduct
146. Id. at 34.
147. Id. at 113.
148. Id. at 114.
149. 1 Annals of Cong. 498 (1789).
150. In J. Borkin, The Corrupt Judge (1962), the author states that fifty-five federal
judges have been subject to congressional inquiry. Eight were censured but not impeached
and seventeen resigned during the period of investigation. Id. at 210. According to Borkin,
judge Martin T. Manton of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first federal judge
indicted for "corrupting his office." Id. at 28.
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of William Blount, then a Senator from Tennessee and a former delegate
to the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention. On July
7, the House resolved to bring impeachment proceedings against him, and
on the following day he was expelled from the Senate.' 1
The articles of impeachment were presented to the Senate on February
7, 1798. They alleged "high crimes and misdemeanors," specifically charg-
ing that, while Spain and England were at war, he conspired to transfer
to Great Britain property belonging to Spain in Florida and Louisiana,
thereby violating America's neutrality and the laws of the United States;
that he caused tribes of Indians in the United States to commence hos-
tilities against the subjects of Spain; that he conspired in violation of
law to undermine the confidence of Indian tribes in an official agent of
the United States appointed to reside among them; that he attempted to
seduce another official from his duty; and that he attempted to foment
certain tribes to disaffection toward the United States." 2
In December, 1798, Blount attacked the jurisdiction of the Senate to
try him. He contended that a Senator was not a civil officer within the
meaning of the Constitution, and that even if he had been a civil officer,
he lost that status when he was expelled from the Senate. 11 An extensive
debate on the point followed. Finally, the Senate rejected, by a vote of
fourteen to eleven, a proposed resolution overruling Blount's plea. The
Senate then decided, by the same vote, to dismiss, finding that Blount's
plea to its jurisdiction was sufficient."" Its decision has established the
precedent that Senators are not impeachable."i
B. John Pickering
In February, 1803, the House of Representatives received from Presi-
dent Thomas Jefferson a message, together with certain evidence, regard-
ing the conduct of John Pickering, a United States district court judge in
New Hampshire. This launched, it is generally believed, an attempt by
Jefferson to remove Federalist judges from the bench and replace them
with Democratic-Republican judges."'
151. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2294-98, at 644-48.
152. Id. § 2302, at 653.
153. Id. § 2310, at 663. See also id. § 2316, at 671.
154. Id. § 2318, at 679.
155. See Potts, Impeachment As a Remedy, 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 15, 18-23 (1927);
Thomas, The Law of Impeachment in the United States, 2 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 378, 386
(1908). Another interpretation is that once a member of the Congress has been expelled,
he subsequently may not be impeached.
156. See 3 A. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 167 (1919); W. Carpenter, Judicial
Tenure in the United States 110-11 (1918); M. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New
Nation 794, 796 (1970).
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On March 2, following a committee's recommendation, the House voted,
forty-five to eight, to impeach Pickering for "high Crimes and misde-
meanors. 157 Four articles of impeachment were presented in the Senate
on January 4, 1804. The first three referred to conduct committed in
violation of law during a suit by the government to condemn a ship and
its cargo. Specifically, it was alleged that, with intent to evade an Act
of Congress, he returned a lawfully seized vessel to its owner without
obtaining a bond for the value of the ship and a certificate from its owner
showing that all duties had been paid as required by the Act; that he
wrongfully refused to hear government testimony; and that "wickedly"
intending to violate the law, he refused the United States Attorney's claim
for an appeal from his decision. Article four charged that he was intoxi-
cated and used profanity on the bench.'1 8
Pickering did not answer the charges. His son, however, petitioned the
Senate to accept evidence of his father's insanity.15 This request was
strongly opposed by some Senators, who apparently felt that if he were
found insane the Senate would not be able to find him guilty of "high
Crimes and misdemeanors."' 160 After some debate, evidence was finally
admitted as to the judge's possible insanity.""' At the trial, the Managers
appointed by the House of Representatives produced evidence consisting
mainly of depositions of witnesses, transcripts of proceedings in Judge
Pickering's court, and recitals of the laws he was said to have violated.lce
Testimony was received as to his habitual intoxication'" but, since Picker-
ing did not appear either in person or by counsel, there was no cross-
examination of witnesses. One of the more heated discussions involved
the form of the question to be voted upon by the Senate. The first form
proposed was: "Is John Pickering, district judge of the district of New
Hampshire, guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors upon the charges
contained in the- article of impeachment, or not guilty?"'' 1 This form,
it was said, was similar to that used in the Hastings trial and would best
"Ccollect the sense of the Court."'85r A second proposal amounted to strik-
ing out the words "high Crimes and misdemeanors." After a closed-session
debate, the second proposal was adopted.
Senator Alexander White of Virginia strongly objected to this form.
157. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2319, at 682.
158. Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 319-22.
159. Id. at 328-29.
160. See W. Carpenter, supra note 156, at 117.
161. Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 332-33.
162. Id. at 333-53.
163. Id. at 354-59.




He argued that to remove a judge without a judgment that the acts
constituted high crimes and misdemeanors would destroy the "good
Behaviour" provision and place judges at the mercy of a majority of
Congress.' 6" When it became clear that the form would not be changed,
some Senators walked out "because they did not choose to be compelled
to give so solemn a vote upon a form of question which they considered
an unfair one .... 167
The vote was taken on the form adopted and, on each article, Pickering
was found guilty by a vote of nineteen to seven. A final question was put
as to whether he should be removed from office. This question was
answered affirmatively by a vote of twenty to six.10
C. Samuel Chase
Two months prior to Pickering's conviction, Representative John Ran-
dolph of Virginia offered a resolution calling for an investigation of the
official conduct of Associate Justice Samuel Chase, a Federalist appointee
to the Supreme Court whose views were anathema to the Democratic-
Republicans." 9 Randolph made a statement of charges against Chase,
to which strong objection was made on the grounds that, even if true,
they amounted only to errors in judgment. It was contended that the
charges did not justify such an investigation. The House decided to
investigate' and, on March 12, 1804, it agreed to a resolution impeach-
ing Chase. Interestingly, this was the same day that the Senate convicted
Pickering.
Eight articles of impeachment were brought against Chase. The first
six concerned his actions at the treason and sedition trials of John Fries
and James T. Callender,' while the last two involved addresses he
delivered to grand juries. 72 Article one charged that he violated his
obligations of office, conducting himself during the Fries trial in an
oppressive and unjust manner by depriving Fries of certain constitutional
166. Id. at 365.
167. Id. at 366.
168. Id. at 367.
169. See 3 A. Beveridge, supra note 156, at 170-71.
170. The Hastings trial was used as a precedent for a single member of Congress putting
the impeachment process into motion. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2343, at 713. See 14 Annals
of Cong. 1173 (1804) for the investigating committee's report.
171. Fries was tried for opposing, in 1799, the collection of a federal property tax en-
acted by Congress in 1798. He was charged with treason, convicted, and sentenced to death,
but was pardoned by President Adams against the advice of his Cabinet. 7 Dictionary of
American Biography 34 (Johnson & Malone ed. 1931). Callender was tried under the
Sedition Law for remarks about President Adams contained in a book he had written. Ho
was convicted, fined two hundred dollars, and sentenced to imprisonment for nine months.
In 1801 President Jefferson granted him a pardon. 3 id. at 425-26 (Johnson ed. 1929).
172. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2346, at 722-24.
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rights. Article two charged that in order to assure the convictions of
Callender, who was accused of libeling President Adams, he allowed a
juror to serve knowing that the juror had made up his mind prior to
the trial. The third charged that, with intent to insure Callender's con-
viction, he refused to admit certain evidence offered by the defense.
Article four charged him with a number of unjust trial practices, allegedly
designed to prejudice the rights of Callender. Article five charged that,
contrary to law, he ordered the arrest of Callender, who had been indicted
for a non-capital offense, when only a summons should have been issued.
The sixth article charged that Callender came before him and was ordered
to trial during the same term, contrary to a law which provided that in
non-capital cases the accused need not answer until the next term of
court. The seventh article charged Justice Chase with improper sugges-
tions to a grand jury concerning the conduct of a certain Delaware printer
whom he had characterized as "seditious." The final article charged that
he delivered an intemperate harangue to a grand jury with intent to
excite resentment against the government.
Chase was defended at the trial by Luther Martin, a former delegate
to the Constitutional Convention. At the trial the House Managers argued
that mere misbehavior, if proven, would suffice to remove a judge. Martin
strongly disagreed, stating that under the Constitution an officer could be
impeached only for indictable offenses, and that no such offenses were
involved in the case at bar.173
In voting on the articles of impeachment, the form of question put to
each Senator was as follows: "Mr. -, how say you; is the respondent,
Samuel Chase, guilty or not guilty of a high crime or misdemeanor, as
charged in the - article of impeachment?' 174 On March 1, 1805, Justice
Chase was found not guilty on each chargeY.73 His acquittal has been
173. Annals of Cong., 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 432 (1805). During the course of his argument,
Martin cited a number of common law commentators for the proposition that a "misde-
meanor" was understood to be a crime. He said that "misbehavior" was synonymous with
"misdemeanor" and that "to be guilty of a misdemeanor, is a violation of some law punish-
able ... ." Id. at 436. He concluded that Chase's impeachment was an improper usage of
the impeachment power and represented a great threat to the integrity of the judiciary.
See 3 Beveridge, supra note 156, at 206.
174. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2363, at 771.
175. The vote was as follows:












viewed as a precedent that judges cannot be removed for political reasons
or mere misbehavior, but only for the "gravest cause."'7
D. James H. Peck
On April 22, 1830, James H. Peck, a federal district court judge in
Missouri, was impeached by the House. He was charged in a single article
with "high misdemeanors in office. 1 " It was alleged that, under the color
of law and his office, he wrongfully convicted and punished an attorney
for contempt. The attorney's only offense was publication of a mildly
critical reply to an article recently written by the judge, which attempted
to justify the judge's decision in a case that was presently on appeal. The
House noted in the charges that the acts alleged were willful, unjust, and
committed in an official capacity. 7 8
In January, 1831, the Managers appointed by the House commenced
their arguments. Their primary contention was that impeachment should
not be limited to indictable offenses. Propounding his views on the nature
of impeachable offenses, Representative Ambrose Spencer of New York
argued:
A judicial misdemeanor consists, in my opinion, in doing an illegal act, colore officii,
with bad motives, or in doing an act within the competency of the court or judge in
some cases, but unwarranted in a particular case from the facts existing in that case,
with bad motives.179
James Buchanan, who later was to become the fourteenth President,
argued that misbehavior was a ground for impeachment-apparently con-
ceding during his argument that to be impeachable the offenses must be
committed in one's official capacity.8 o In contrast, counsel for Peck
argued that mere mistake of law, without wrongful intent, does not con-
stitute a high crime or misdemeanor, and that it would be absurd to hold
a judge answerable for an error in judgment. He asserted that intent
was a necessary element in any finding of impeachable conduct, and that
176. Blackmar, On the Removal of Judges: The Impeachment Trial of Samuel Chase,
48 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 183, 187 (1965). Following the vote in the Chase trial, John Randolph,
one of the House Managers, proposed an amendment to the Constitution making federal
judges removable by the President on the address of the House and Senate. 2 Am. Hist.
Ass'n. Ann. Rep. 1896, at 149 (1897); see 15 Annals of Cong. 1213 (1805).
177. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2370, at 786-88.
178. See Taylor, The American Law of Impeachment, 180 N. Am. Rev. 502, 511 (1905).
179. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2379, at 798. "Colore officii" has been defined as "[o]fficer's
acts unauthorized by officer's position, though done in form that purports that acts are
done by reason of official duty and by virtue of office." Black's Law Dictionary 332 (4th
rev. ed. 1968).
180. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2381, at 800-01.
[Vol. 39
IMPEACHING FEDERAL JUDGES
such intent was lacking in Peck's case because his acts were within the
purview of his official power.' 8'
On January 31, 1831, the following question was put to each of the
Senators in alphabetical order: "Mr. Senator -. : What say you: Is
James H. Peck, judge of the district court of the United States for
the district of Missouri, guilty or not guilty of the high misdemeanor
charged in the article of impeachment exhibited against him by the
House of Representatives?"'" -
The vote on the question thus phrased was twenty-one in favor of
conviction and twenty-two opposed.lss Peck was therefore acquitted.
E. West H. Humphreys
Early in 1861, West H. Humphreys, United States district court judge
in Tennessee, ceased holding court and commenced acting as a judge for
the Confederacy. On January 8, 1862, a resolution was introduced and
agreed to in the House of Representatives authorizing a committee to
inquire into his conduct.' Two months later the committee submitted
its report, in which it recommended impeachment proceedings. Subse-
quently, seven articles of impeachment alleging "high crimes and misde-
meanors 85 were presented against him.
The first article charged that, in violation of his oath and duties, he
endeavored to incite revolt and rebellion against the government by
publicly declaring that it was the right of the people, by an ordinance of
secession, to absolve themselves from all allegiance to the United States
government, the Constitution, and the laws thereof. Article two alleged
that, with "intent to abuse" the trust reposed in him and to "subvert the
lawful authority and Government of the United States," he unlawfully
agreed to an ordinance of secession "with other evil-minded persons."
The third article charged that, in conjunction with other persons, he
"unlawfully" organized armed rebellion and levied war against the United
States. In the fourth article, he was accused of conspiring with Jefferson
181. Id. § 2382, at 801-02. His attorney argued that the court had the power exercised
by Peck but that if it did not have such power "or if, having it, the case was not a case
proper for its application, still the act did not proceed from the evil anti malicious intention
with which it is charged, and which it is absolutely necessary should have accompanied it
to constitute the guilt of an impeachable offense." Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 49(nt)
(Supp. 1868).
182. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2383, at 803. Following the trial, Congress promptly enacted
an amendment to the judicial code limiting the power of judges to punish for contempt.
L. Goldberg, Lawless Judges 93 (1935).
183. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2383, at 804.
184. Id. § 2384, at 805.
185. Id. § 2390, at 810.
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Davis and others to oppose the United States government by force. The
fifth charged that, in disregard of his duties and with intent to aid and
abet the overthrow of the government, he refused to hold court as re-
quired. Article six claimed that, with "intent to subvert the authority of
the Government," he unlawfully acted as a Confederate court judge.180
Article seven alleged that, while assuming to act as a Confederate judge
and "without lawful authority, and with intent to injure," he caused the
unlawful arrest of a United States citizen, one William G. Brownlow.
After hearing the articles, the Senate decided that a summons should
issue directing Humphreys to answer the charges. The summons was
issued and, on the return day, the Senate convened as a high court for
the trial. Humphreys did not appear on that day or on the adjourned day.
Consequently, the trial proceeded ex parte. Witnesses were called and
examined but, since Humphreys was not represented, there was no cross-
examination. 18 7 At the conclusion of the Managers' presentation, the fol-
lowing question was put to the Senate: "Is the accused, West H. Humph-
reys, guilty or not guilty of the high crimes and misdemeanors as charged
in this article of impeachment?"' 8
Humphreys was found guilty by the requisite two-thirds vote on all
the charges, except those in specification two of article six.' 8 A resolution
was then passed removing him from office and disqualifying him from
holding any office of trust, honor or profit under the United States.
F. Andrew Johnson
Following his succession to the Presidency on April 15, 1865, Andrew
Johnson became the protagonist in a bitter struggle between the executive
186. Specification two of this article charged that while acting as a Judge of the Con-
federacy, he ordered the confiscation of the property of Andrew Johnson and one John
Catron. Specification three charged that, acting in an illegal position, he caused the un-
lawful arrest of citizens of the United States for their rejection of the Confederacy. Id.
at 811.
187. Id. § 2395.
188. Id. § 2396, at 817.
189. The vote was as follows:
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and legislative branches of government over Reconstruction.' 0 While the
specifics leading to his eventual impeachment are numerous,20' the Tenure
of Office Act seems to have served as the catalyst. The ostensible purpose
of the Act was to prohibit presidential appointments after the Senate
had adjourned, while the intent of its sponsors was to strip the President
of the power to remove Republicans from their appointed offices.' - The
Act forbade presidential removal of officials named by the President
without his first obtaining the Senate's consent.103 Johnson and his Cabinet
felt the Act was unconstitutional,"° and he therefore vetoed it. Despite
his veto, the Act secured the two-thirds vote necessary for passage,
thereby setting the stage for the drama that followed.10- With a hostile
Congress anxious to impeach Johnson, Stanton was informed of his
dismissal in a letter from the President.108
On February 21, 1868, Stanton informed the House of Representatives
of his removal and the appointment of Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-
General of the Army, as Secretary of War ad interim. 7 That same day
John Covode offered a resolution in the House that Johnson be im-
peached. 9 The Senate, after a seven hour deliberation, adopted a resolu-
tion finding that the removal was without authority, 0 3 and Stanton
barricaded himself in his office. On February 22, Representative Thad-
deus Stevens of Pennsylvania introduced in the House a resolution that
"Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high
crimes and misdemeanors." 200 After some discussion the vote was taken
and the President was impeached by a vote of one hundred and twenty-six
to forty-seven. 0° A House committee then drafted nine articles against
190. D. Dewitt, The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson 1 (1903) [hereinafter
cited as Dewitt].
191. See E. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (1960); G. Milton, The
Age of Hate (1930); J. Savage, Andrew Johnson (1866).
192. Dewitt 180-81.
193. C. Bowers, The Tragic Era 155 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Bowers].
194. Dewitt 202. As a result of his strong disapproval, Stanton was selected to assist
Seward in preparation of the President's veto message. Id. at 203.
195. See Bowers 155. L[T]he next day the 'New York World' published the names of
the two thirds in borders of black, with the comment: 'The time is coming when every
man in the above list will stand accurst in our history."' Id. (footnote omitted).
196. Dewitt 344.
197. The Great Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson (1863) [hereinafter cited
as Trial]; Dewitt 344-46.
198. Trial 14; Dewitt 346-56.
199. Trial 14.
2OO. Id. at 14-15.
201. Id. at 15.
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Johnson. The first article charged that the removal of Stanton was unlaw-
ful as an intentional violation of the Constitution and Tenure Act. The
second charged that the letter appointing Thomas was an intentional
violation of the Constitution and of the Tenure Act. Article three alleged
Thomas' appointment was a violation of the Constitution. Articles four
through eight, referred to as the "Conspiracy Articles," also pertained to
Stanton's removal. The fourth charged a conspiracy with Thomas and
others to prevent Stanton from holding office, in violation of the Consti-
tution. Article five accused the same persons of conspiracy to prevent the
execution of the Tenure Act by attempting to remove Stanton. The sixth
alleged conspiracy to forcibly take the property of the United States at
the War Department. Article seven charged conspiracy to prevent Stanton
from holding office, in violation of the Tenure Act. Article eight charged
conspiracy to seize United States property, also in violation of the Tenure
Act. Finally, article nine concerned a statute requiring all orders to pass
through a General of the Army. Johnson had stated that the statute was
unconstitutional and, accordingly, generals of lesser rank should take
orders directly from him. 02
Unsatisfied with these articles, Representative Benjamin Butler offered
a tenth "to clothe that bone and sinew with flesh and blood and to show
him [Johnson] ... as the quivering sinner that he is .... ,,203 Butler's
article charged that Johnson, intending to bring the United States Con-
gress into "disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt and reproach," did openly
and publicly declare "with a loud voice, certain intemperate, inflamma-
tory and scandalous harangues" against Congress and its laws, "amid the
cries, jeers and laughter of the multitudes then assembled in hearing." 0"
Stevens conceived an eleventh article as a catch-all, explaining: "If my
article is inserted, what chance has Andrew Johnson to escape? " 25 Rep-
resentative John A. Bingham of Ohio introduced that article, which dealt
with a speech of August 18, 1866, in which Johnson was alleged to have
declared that the thirty-ninth Congress was not a Congress of the United
States authorized to exercise legislative powers, but only a congress of
part of the states, and that its legislation was not binding upon him. The
article stated that in pursuance of this declaration and in violation of his
oath of office, Johnson attempted to prevent the execution of the Tenure
Act and two other statutes, such being a high misdemeanor in office.200
Johnson's trial opened on March 5, 1868, with Chief Justice Salmon
202. Id. at 19-20.
203. Id. at 20.
204. Id. at 21.




P. Chase administering to each senator an oath that he would do "im-
partial justice, according to the Constitution and laws."120 At the outset
of the trial, the Managers defined an impeachable crime or misdemeanor
as:
[O]ne in its nature or consequences subsersive [sic] of some fundamental or essential
principle of government, or highly prejudicial to the public interest, and this may con-
sist of a violation of the Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or of duty, by an
act committed or omitted, or, without violating a positive law, by the abuse of discre-
tionary powers from improper motives, or for any improper purpose.203
Butler, admitting this definition exceeded the common law definition,
cited the 1388 English impeachment of Belknap and the other judges
for the proposition that the Senate was bound by no law, being a law
unto itself and "bound only by the natural principles of equity and
justice.) 20 9
President Johnson never once appeared at the trial, but left the defense
to an able team of attorneys.210 Benjamin Curtis, a former Justice of
the Supreme Court, opened his defense by seeking to demonstrate that
Stanton's removal was not within the sweep of the Tenure Act.211 In
answer to the Managers' claim that the Senate was a law unto itself in
convicting for a high crime or misdemeanor, Curtis paraphrased the
constitutional provisions on impeachment and concluded:
[I]t is impossible to come to the conclusion that the Constitution of the United States
has not designated impeachment offenses as offenses against the United States. It has
provided for the trial... established a tribunal for. . . trying them ... directed the
tribunal... to pronounce a judgment and to inflict a punishment, and yet the honor-
able manager tells us that this is not a court, and that it is bound by no law.211
Curtis argued that if every senator was a law unto himself, able to declare
an act criminal after its commission, the constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws would be violated. Comparing the Managers' argument
to a bill of attainder, he asked: "Of what use would be [the] prohibition in
the Constitution against passing bills of attainder if it is only necessary
for the House of Representatives, by a majority, to vote articles of
impeachment, and for two-thirds of the Senate to sustain the articles?"213
Curtis declared that it was the duty of the Senate, having taken an oath
to apply the law according to the Constitution, to find that a law existed,
207. Id. at 22-23.
208. Id. at 47 (emphasis deleted).
209. Id. at 48. While such a position had been espoused in 1388, 4 Hatsell 64, it had
formally been rejected by the Lords as early as 1709. Id. at 282-83.
210. Dewitt 406-07.
211. Bowers 185-86; Dewitt 424-27.
212. Trial 110.
213. Id. at 111.
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construe and apply it to the case, and find criminal intention to break it
before it could convict on any article 214
On Saturday, May 16, 1868, the Senate met to vote on the articles.
The eleventh article was to be voted upon first, after which the first ten
articles were to be considered. 15 After the clerk had read the eleventh
article, the Chief Justice inquired of each senator as he responded to the
calling of the roll: "Mr. Senator- how say you? Is the respondent,
Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, guilty or not guilty of
a high misdemeanor, as charged in this article? 2 10
The result of this historic vote was thirty-five to nineteen, one vote
short of conviction. After a ten day adjournment, the Senate reassembled
to vote on the remaining articles. The Managers withdrew article one and
permitted a vote on articles two and three. Again the vote was thirty-five
to nineteen, one less than the number necessary for conviction. The
Managers did not call for a vote on the remaining articles, but adjourned,
leaving judgment on articles one, and four through ten, to posterity.2 17
G. William W. Belknap
Early in 1876, the House Ways and Means Committee proposed a
resolution authorizing general investigations into the operations of various
governmental departments. The resolution passed and less than two
months later, on March 2, one of the investigating committees reported
that it had uncovered "unquestioned evidence of ...malfeasance in
office" by William W. Belknap, then Secretary of War.218 The report
stated also that President Grant had that morning accepted Belknap's
resignation. The report recommended the adoption of three resolutions:
one impeaching Belknap; one calling for the preparation of articles
against him; and the third instructing a committee to go immediately to
the bar of the Senate and impeach Belknap. The resolutions passed,
On April 4, 1876, the House Managers appeared at the bar of the
Senate and presented five articles of impeachment against Belknap.' 10
The first article charged that, while serving as Secretary of War, Belknap
appointed as post trader at Fort Sill one Caleb P. Marsh, who had an
agreement with a John S. Evans under which Marsh would have Belknap
appoint Evans as the post trader in his place. When this agreement was
executed, it was charged, Belknap "unlawfully and corruptly" received
214. Id.
215. 2 Trial of Andrew Johnson 484-86 (1868).
216. Id. at 486.
217. Dewitt 574-76.
218. Cong. Rec., 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 1426 (1896).
219. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2449, at 910.
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certain sums of money from Marsh for appointing Evans, thereby being
guilty of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors in office." Articles two, three,
four and five also charged Belknap with knowingly receiving money in
consummation of this scheme. Article three charged that Belknap "crimi-
nally" disregarded his duty in allowing Evans to remain post trader,
causing great injury to personnel at that post and to the country.20
On April 17, 1876, Belknap attacked the jurisdiction of the Senate to
try him, asserting that due to his resignation he was no longer a civil
officer when the charges were made against him. The House Managers
argued that the limitation of impeachment to "Officers" in Article H,
Section 4, dealt with the position and not necessarily with the time when
it was occupied.22 ' Belknap's counsel argued that if he were convicted,
Congress would be setting a precedent that every citizen could be im-
peached.22 On May 29, after a lengthy debate, the Senate decided, by a
vote of thirty-seven to twenty-nine, that it had jurisdiction. -- The Senate
then gave Belknap until June 16 to answer. When that date arrived,
counsel for Belknap appeared but refused to put in a plea. Instead, he
filed a document objecting to the previous vote because two-thirds of the
Senate had not overruled Belknap's plea. It therefore was contended that
the proceeding should be dismissed.V 2 4 The case nevertheless proceeded
to trial, and Belknap was acquitted. Although the required two-thirds
vote for removal failed, a majority voted guilty on each of the five
articles2 25
H. Charles Swayne
Acting upon a joint resolution of the Florida legislature, Representa-
tive William B. Lamar rose in the House on December 10, 1903, and
recommended that Charles Swayne be impeached.?0 At the time, Swayne
was a United States district court judge in Florida. Lamar's resolution
called for the House Committee on the Judiciary to investigate Swayne's
220. Id. at 910-14.
221. Id. § 2007, at 315.
222. Id. at 313.
223. Id. § 2459, at 934.
224. Id. § 2461, at 936-37.
225. The vote was as follows:






Id. § 2467, at 945. See also Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 15, 20
(1927). -
226. 38 Cong. Rec. 95 (1903).
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conduct. A committee was appointed and in March, 1904, it reported that
Judge Swayne had "continuously and persistently violated the plain words
of a statute of the United States, and subjected himself to punishment
for the commission of a high misdemeanor. 2 27 The report cited many
examples of judicial misconduct, and the Committee recommended im-
peaching him on the ground "of high misdemeanor." A strong minority
report opposed these conclusions, as a result of which a further investiga-
tion was conducted. In December, 1904, almost eight months later, a
resolution of impeachment was finally agreed upon, with an amendment
accusing him "of high crimes and misdemeanors. 228
On January 24, 1905, the select committee of the House which had
been appointed to formulate the articles against Swayne presented twelve
articles of impeachment, charging as follows:229 That Swayne, while a
United States District Court Judge, made false claims against the gov-
ernment, and in support of these claims, prepared and signed false certifi-
cates of his expenses as a judge; that on another occasion he made false
claims against the government and committed the crime of obtaining
money under false pretenses; that he committed similar high crimes
and misdemeanors on another occasion; that "while in the exercise
of his office," he appropriated for his personal use a railroad car in the
possession of a receiver appointed by him, making use of the railroad
and its personnel without making compensation to the owner and allow-
ing the receiver a credit for these expenses, thereby being guilty of
"abuse of judicial power and of a high misdemeanor in office;" that he
lived outside the district in which he was assigned, violating a statute
which made it a "high misdemeanor" to do so; and that while in "the
exercise of his office," he maliciously and unlawfully found an attorney
guilty of contempt and fined and jailed him, thereby constituting an
"abuse of judicial power and . a high misdemeanor in office."1230
At the Senate trial, Judge Swayne submitted a brief in which he con-
tended that neither indictability nor mere misbehavior was intended to
be the standard for impeachment. After examining the common law pre-
cedents, the early state constitutions, the debates at the Constitutional
Convention, and the American precedents, the brief concluded that im-
peachment lies for either treason or bribery committed anywhere and for
227. H.R. Rep. No. 1905, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. (1904); 3 Hinds' Precedents § 2470, at
951. It is to be noted that the only offense characterized by the committee as a high mis-
demeanor involved statutory violations. None of the other charges were so characterized.
228. 39 Cong. Rec. 248 (1904).
229. 39 Cong. Rec. 754-55 (1905).
230. A minority of the committee contended that none of the charges, except those
relating to false certificates, were sufficient to warrant impeachment. Id. at 755.
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other high crimes and misdemeanors, which "must consist of judicial
acts, performed with an evil or wicked intent, by a judge while admin-
istering justice in a court ... ."231 Therefore, it was argued, since the first
seven articles charged personal misconduct, the Senate did not have juris-
diction and should dismiss the proceeding. The House Managers argued
that impeachment covered non-judicial acts and, in the alternative, that
Swayne's conduct was official in nature.1 2 In their closing arguments,
Swayne's counsel urged that the impeachment provisions were embodied
in the Constitution "with a meaning that can never be changed by the
Congress of the United States.1s
On February 27, 1905, a vote was taken and Swayne was acquitted on
each article.2s4
I. Robert W. Archbald
In February 1912, the Interstate Commerce Commission brought to
President Taft's attention charges of improper conduct against Robert
Archbald, a United States circuit court judge, who was a member of the
Commerce Court. The President ordered the Attorney General to conduct
a full investigation, following which it was concluded that the information
discovered should be transmitted to the House Judiciary Committee.235
231. Id. at 3028-33 (1905) (emphasis deleted).
232. 3 Rinds' Precedents § 2011, at 328-29. In support of their primary argument, they
suggested a situation in which a judge might be convicted and imprisoned for forging a note.
It was argued that under those circumstances he obviously should not continue to draw
his salary as a judge. Id. at 328. See generally Taylor, The American Law of Impeachment,
180 N. Am. Rev. 502, 512 (1905), where the author states that this situation can be cured
only by constitutional amendment.
233. 3 Rinds' Precedents § 2010, at 327.
234. The vote was as follows:













Id. § 2485, at 979. For a political analysis of this and the following cases, see ten Broeh,
Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship mpeachments Since 1903, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 185
(1939). See also Littlefield, The Impeachment of Judge Swayne, 17 The Green Bag 193
(1905).
235. 6 Cannon's Precedents § 498, at 685.
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A period of investigation followed, including appearances by Archbald
and his counsel at committee hearings.
On July 11, 1912, the committee's report, including a memorandum of
law and thirteen articles of impeachment, 8 was adopted by the House.
Article one charged that Judge Archbald, while a judge on the commerce
court, formed a partnership for the purpose of purchasing certain proper-
ties for future sale, using his office to induce a certain corporation which
was then a party litigant before the commerce court to contract to sell the
properties to the partnership. This, it alleged, constituted a "high crime
and misdemeanor in office."
The second article asserted that Archbald, for consideration, interceded
in a case before the Interstate Commerce Commission, using the influence
of his office to effectuate a settlement and to induce agreement to a stock
sale proposed by the party whom the judge was assisting. This charge
further specified that the judge did so knowing that the case was subject
to review in the Commerce Court, and that the party he sought to influ-
ence already had a case pending in that court. The article concluded that
the judge therefore was guilty of misbehavior and of a "high crime and
misdemeanor in office."
The third article charged a "high misdemeanor in office," alleging that
Archbald used his official position to influence a coal company, which
was owned by a railroad then a litigant in the commerce court, to lease
certain properties to the judge and his friends, in return for which he
agreed to use the railroad to transport the products of these properties.
Article four accused the judge of being guilty of "misbehavior in office"
and of a "misdemeanor as ... judge" as a result of his secret communica-
tions with an attorney for a litigant in a case before his court, in which he
requested to see a witness for the purpose of obtaining his explanation of
certain testimony, and informed the attorney of certain evidence "detri-
mental" to his client and asked for an explanation.
The fifth article charged that he attempted to use his influence as
judge to secure an operating lease for a certain individual, knowing that
this person had previously failed in such negotiations. The article further
alleged that after the attempted negotiations, the judge accepted a promis-
sory note for his efforts, constituting "misbehavior" and "high crimes
and misdemeanors in office."
The sixth article charged him with using his influence as a judge to
induce the officers of two related companies to purchase a certain tract
of land. Article seven accused Judge Archbald of accepting an interest
in a speculative stock enterprise with a person involved in a litigation
236. H.R. Rep. No. 946, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1912), 48 Cong. Rec. 8697-708 (1912).
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before his court. It further alleged, as did article eight, that Archbald
had lent his name to a note, knowing it would be presented to a person
subject to his official influence. The ninth article charged the judge with
using his position to coerce a party to discount one of his notes by having
it presented to an attorney who practiced before the commerce court,
and further charged that after the note was discounted, it was never
paid. The tenth article accused him of accepting large sums of money
for pleasure trips from an individual who was an officer or director in
a number of corporations under the jurisdiction of the commerce court.
The eleventh article alleged that he accepted money from attorneys who
practiced before his court and that money was solicited by court officers
whom the judge had appointed. The twelfth article charged that Archbald
had appointed as a jury commissioner the general counsel of a railroad
company which was under the jurisdiction of the commerce court, and
that, knowing of this relationship, he nevertheless allowed the attorney
to serve.
The thirteenth and last article charged that Archbald had at various
times sought to obtain credit from parties interested in the results of
suits pending in his court; that he had carried on business for speculation
and profit and, for consideration, compromised cases pending before
the Interstate Commerce Commission; that he had used his influence
as a judge to induce various officers and companies engaged in interstate
commerce to enter into contracts and agreements in which he was then
financially interested; that he received interests in these contracts in
consideration of his using his influence; and that the judge's efforts in
securing contracts from the railroad companies then having suits pending
in the commerce court continued for more than a year.237
At his trial Archbald claimed that the charges, even if true, did not
constitute impeachable offenses. He admitted most of the facts but denied
the existence of any wrongful intent.F38 He also challenged articles seven
through twelve and part of thirteen on the ground that the acts charged
were committed, if at all, prior to his appointment as a court of appeals
judge.239
The Managers argued in their brief that impeachment may be had
237. Id. at 8706-08.
238. Id. at 9795-802.
239. See Part III of Respondent's Brief, 6 Cannon's Precedents 640, citing Record of
Trial at 1067. See also ten Broek, supra note 235, at 193. It is not dear in which way the
challenge was settled. This is because the only article upon which a conviction was had, and
which also charged offenses allegedly committed by the judge in his former position, was
article thirteen, an article which the defense conceded consisted only partially of such
charges.
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for less than indictable conduct.40 Counsel for Archbald argued to the
contrary, based upon a study of the most current English precedents. 241
It was argued that, at the very least, conduct of a criminal nature must
be found. In response, Representative John W. Davis, a House Manager,
argued that such a standard gives the prosecution nothing to fear because
"[i]f the phrase 'criminal in nature' means those things which might
be made crimes by legislative prohibition, every act here charged against
this respondent comes within the description.3242
The trial, which was sparsely attended by senators, 43 resulted in a
vote of guilty on the first, third, fourth, fifth and thirteenth articles,
and Archbald was removed from office.244 In addition, the Senate voted
to disqualify him from holding future office.2
45
Following the vote a number of Senators filed opinions explaining
their votes. Some stated that they thought criminality was the standard
for removal; 248 some only voted guilty where they thought the offenses,
as proven, constituted "high crimes or misdemeanors," and had voted not
guilty where the charge involved only misconduct.247 Others2-48 said
that they had voted not guilty on charges in which proof of evil intent
240. 48 Cong. Rec. 8702-05 (1912).
241. 6 Cannon's Precedents § 462, at 646.
242. Id. § 463, at 648.
243. See Simpson, Federal Jinpeachments, 64 U. Pa. L. Rev. 803, 820 (1916).
244. The vote was as follows:














6 Cannon's Precedents 707. J. Borkin, The Corrupt Judge 199 (1962), characterized the
Archbald conviction as being based on the judge using his "official position for private gain
and accepting loans from litigants before him."
245. 6 Cannon's Precedents § 512, at 708. The vote to disqualify was 39 to 35, or less
than two-thirds.
246. 49 Cong. Rec. 1499 (1913) (opinion of Senator Catron); id. at 1537-41 (opinion
of Senator Paynter); see id. at 1497 (opinion of Senator Crawford).
247. 49 Cong. Rec. 1448 (1913) (opinion of Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu
Root) ; see id. at 1535 (opinions of Senators Penrose and Cullom).
248. Id. at 1495 (opinion of Senator Gronna); id. at 1498 (opinion of Senator Oliver).
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was lacking, and yet a few others said they had voted guilty on any
charge involving less than good behavior.240
J. George W. English
On January 13, 1925, Representative Harry B. Hawes of Missouri
introduced a resolution calling for an investigation of charges made in
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch against Judge George W. English, a United
States Judge for the Eastern District of Illinois.250 A subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee was appointed to investigate, and it
presented its report on March 25, 1926.21 This report consisted of a
review of the evidence uncovered, the subcommittee's views on the law
of impeachment, and a resolution containing five articles of impeach-
ment5 2 The report was adopted on April 1, 1926, by a vote of three
hundred and six to sixty-two.
The first article accused him of having disbarred several attorneys
without notice or hearing, and of using his power to summon people in
order to harass, threaten and oppress. The second article cited him for
managing the bankruptcy affairs of his court for the personal benefit
of himself and a certain referee. The third charged unlawful and inten-
tional favoritism in the appointment of receivers and other practices,
including his acceptance of a cash "gift" from one of his appointees.
The fourth article alleged corrupt practices in the handling of the funds
of bankrupt companies before his court, including an agreement to de-
posit funds in a particular bank which agreed, in turn, to employ his
son. The last article alleged several instances wherein the judge had
displayed unlawful, intentional and corrupt favoritism in his appoint-
ments, rulings and decrees.
On November 4, 1926, prior to the commencement of his trial, Judge
English tendered his resignation to President Calvin Coolidge, who ac-
cepted it immediately. On November 10 the House Managers presented
this information to the Senate, and subsequently recommended that the
249. Id. at 1494-95 (opinion of Senator John D. Works); id. at 149S-99 (opinion of
Senator Porter J. M'Cumber).
250. H.R. Res. 402, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925); 66 Cong. Rec. 1790 (1925); 6 Cannon's
Precedents 778.
251. H.R. Rep. No. 653, 69th Cong., Ist Ses. (1926); 67 Cong. Rec. 6280-87 (1926); 6
Cannon's Precedents § 545, at 779.
252. The subcommittee stated that impeachable conduct included, among other things,
gross betrayals of the public interest, tyrannical abuses of power, and inexcusable neglect
of duty. All of these were impeachable, in the subcommittee's opinion, whether committed




proceedings be discontinued.25 On December 13, 1926, the Senate, by
a vote of seventy to nine, ordered the proceedings discontinued.
K. Harold Louderback
In May, 1932, the San Francisco Bar Association wrote President
Herbert Hoover concerning the conduct of Harold Louderback, a United
States district judge in California. The letter contained references to
various newspaper articles about the judge.254 The matter was promptly
transferred to the Attorney General's office which, in turn, referred it
to the House Judiciary Committee. On May 26, 1932, Representative
Fiorello LaGuardia of New York introduced a resolution calling for the
designation of a special committee to inquire into the official conduct
of the judge..2 55 A special committee was appointed; it held hearings,
conducted an investigation, and reported that the evidence failed to
show that impeachment was warranted.25 6 A minority of the committee,
led by Representative Hatton W. Sumners of Texas, recommended im-
peachment. On February 24, 1933, after debating the two recommenda-
tions, the House passed a substitute resolution, stating, in part, that
"Harold Louderback ...be impeached of misdemeanors in office." '
The resolution recited five articles of impeachment.2 8
The first article charged that the judge, at the instance of a party
to whom he was indebted, by using promises of higher fees and threats
of lower allowances, sought to force a court appointed receiver to des-
ignate as his counsel an attorney of the judge's choosing and that, not
meeting with success, he "willfully" discharged the receiver. The article
also charged that Louderback violated the law by establishing a fictitious
residence, that he had done so to effectuate the removal of a case in
which he shortly expected to be involved, and that he unlawfully regis-
tered to vote at this residence-an act which constituted a felony. Article
two charged him with unlawfully granting excessive allowances to a
receiver and, "contrary to the law," making an order requiring the receiver
to pay certain sums over to an Insurance Commissioner conditional on
253. 6 Cannon's Precedents § 547, at 784-85. They made it clear, however, that in their
opinion the resignation of English in no way affected the rights of the Senate to hear and
determine the charges. The resolution containing this recommendation was passed, 290 to
23. Id. at 785.
254. 75 Cong. Rec. 12,470 (1932); 6 Cannon's Precedents § 513, at 710-11.
255. H.R. Res. 239, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.; 75 Cong. Rec, 11,358 (1932); 6 Cannon's
Precedents § 513, at 709-10.
256. H.R. Rep. No. 2065, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933); 6 Cannon's Precedents § 514, at
711. The report did censure the judge for his conduct.
257. The substitute resolution was proposed by Representative LaGuardla of New York.
6 Cannon's Precedents § 514, at 712.
258. 76 Cong. Rec. 4914-16 (193),
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the Commissioner's promise not to appeal from the allowances the judge
had granted to the receiver. The third article charged that he appointed
an incompetent receiver "in disregard of the rights" of litigants in his
court and that he refused to allow a hearing on the subject, depriving
interested parties of an opportunity to be heard. The fourth article
charged that he "willfully and unlawfully" granted an improper applica-
tion appointing a personal friend as receiver of a holding company, and
that solely because of this appointment, a petition in bankruptcy was
filed against the company. Article five charged that he was guilty of
"a misdemeanor in office" as shown by his past conduct, including his
methods for appointment of incompetent receivers, which practices led
to widespread fear that cases in his court were decided with partiality
and prejudice.
On April 11, 1933, Louderback answered the charges. He contended
that the offenses, even if true, did not constitute impeachable conduct.
He specifically objected to the vagueness of article five, as a result of
which Manager Sumners consented to have the House revise the article.
A month later, he presented a detailed charge. Nevertheless, objections
in the form of a motion to strike or make more definite were again made
to article five.259 In addition to an objection based on vagueness, it was
argued that certain offenses not committed in his present office were
not within the Senate's jurisdiction in an impeachment proceeding. The
House again amended article five, after which Louderback filed an an-
swer. During the trial which followed, a dispute arose as to whether or
not it was proper for the Managers to introduce evidence of orders made
by Louderback when he was a state court judge. This evidence was
intended to show that even at that time he had appointed the same close
friends as appraisers. The evidence was accepted and upon the conclusion
of the evidence, the following question was put to each Senator: "Senator,
how say you? Is the respondent, Harold Louderback, guilty or not guilty
as charged in this article?" On the call of the roll, the necessary two-
thirds vote was not attained and Louderback was acquitted on each of
the five articles. Indeed, on four of the five articles not even a majority
found him guilty.2 60
L. Halsted L. Ritter
In 1929, four years after moving to the State of Florida, Halsted L.
Ritter was appointed a United States district judge. In May 1933, a
resolution was passed in the House of Representatives directing an in-
259. 6 Cannon's Precedents § 521, at 731-32.
260. Id. § 524, at 742.
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vestigation into his official conduct.2 ' The investigation lasted three
years. After its completion, Representative Green of Florida, in January
of 1936, rose in the House and said: "I impeach Halsted L. Ritter...
for high crimes and misdemeanors."2"2 He supported his charge by read-
ing from the committee's investigation report, which concluded that the
judge's conduct warranted impeachment." 3
Seven articles of impeachment were prepared and presented to the
Senate. 0 4 The first charged that Ritter was guilty of "misbehavior and
of a high crime and misdemeanor in office" resulting from his acceptance
of remuneration from a former law partner, who paid it out of an allow-
ance made by Ritter as compensation for services his former partner
had rendered in a receivership. The second article charged him with
"misbehavior ... and high crimes and misdemeanors in office" based on
a conspiracy with his former law partner and others to place a certain
company in receivership and continue it in litigation before his court,
and refusal to dismiss the case after the plaintiff had so requested. Article
three stated that Ritter was guilty of "a high crime and misdemeanor
in office" for violating a section of the Judicial Code making it unlawful
for any federal judge to practice law while in office. It charged specifically
that after becoming a judge, he wrote to the counsel for a client of his
former law firm, stating that he would be available for consultation until
completion of the matter upon which he was working when he became
a judge. It was alleged that the letter spoke of the fee which he should
be allowed and that shortly thereafter he accepted a fee in that amount.
Article four also charged him with a "high crime and misdemeanor in
office" for practicing law, in that he allegedly received compensation for
representing a client in a Florida real estate transaction. Articles five
and six both charged him with "high crimes and misdemeanors in office"
consisting of willful evasion of income tax. Each of these articles cited
separate instances in which Ritter had received sums of money and
failed to report them in his return. The seventh and last article charged
that Judge Ritter was guilty of a "high crime and misdemeanor" in that
his offenses were such as to support a reasonable assumption that they
would prejudice the public view of the court's fairness. This article also
reiterated specific previous charges, such as practicing law while on the
federal bench, accepting gratuities in receiverships, and evading the
income tax.
In answer, Judge Ritter admitted most of the facts charged but denied
261. H.R. Res. 163, 73d Cong., Ist Sess., 77 Cong. Rec. 4575 (1933).
262. 80 Cong. Rec. 404 (1936).
263. Id. at 410.
264. Id. at 3486-88, 4654-56.
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any wrongful intent.Y 5 He said that he had failed to mention the sums
in his tax returns because they would simply have been cancelled out
by a loss he had sustained in a prior year. He argued that the money
he received from his former partner was due and owing to him by way
of a prior debt, and he claimed the gratuities he received were innocently
accepted. In his closing argument on behalf of the House Managers,
Representative Sumners declared that once a substantial doubt as to a
judge's integrity arises, he forfeits his right to office and "[i]t is not
essential to prove guilt." ''a Sumners pointed out, however, the unavoid-
ability of finding criminality in Judge Ritter's conduct and went to
some length to show him as a corrupt and malicious judge.
On April 17, the Senate voted on the articles presented against Judge
Ritter.2 7 A majority of the Senate found him guilty on the first, second,
third, sixth and seventh articles; however, the two-thirds vote of guilty,
requisite for removal, was present only on the seventh and last article.
- s
Thereupon, a judgment was entered removing him from office. A pro-
posed order to disqualify him permanently from holding public office,
however, was voted down unanimously. -9
In an opinion filed after the vote, Senator Austin stated that the six
acquittals could not have fairly added up to a conviction. He contended
that under the circumstances, the conviction on article seven was viola-
tive of traditional and basic rules of our system of justice. - ° Subse-
quently, Ritter sued for his salary, charging that the Senate had exceeded
its jurisdiction in trying and convicting him on charges which were not
impeachable offenses under the constitution. The court of claims, how-
ever, dismissed the case, stating that the Senate has sole jurisdiction
in impeachments.27
IV. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE IMPEACHMENT PROVISIONS
The debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 show that the
impeachment provisions contained in the Constitution were not hastily
arrived at, but rather evolved over a period of months and were the subject
265. Id. at 4899-906.
266. Id. at 5469.
267. Id. at 5602-06. The form of the question read: "Senators, how say you? Is the
respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, guilty or not guilty?" Id. at 5602.
268. Id. at 5602-06. There was one vote short of two-thirds on the first of the six
articles. It is noteworthy that 55 of the 56 Senators who voted guilty on the seventh article
had previously voted guilty on one or more of the first six articles. The remaining Senator
(Minton) had voted not guilty on each of the hrst six.
269. Id. at 5607.
270. Id. at 5752-56.
271. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. CL 293, cert. denied, 300 US. 663 (1936).
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of extensive consideration. In formulating the provisions, the framers
were very much concerned with maintaining the independence of the
executive and judiciary while at the same time establishing a procedure
for removing public officials when the public security required it. They
rejected the British system of "address" as a means of removing judges
and the use of the word "maladministration" as a ground for impeach-
ment, in both instances because of their concern that the judiciary or
executive might be rendered subservient to the Congress .2 2 They de-
signed the impeachment provisions as a safeguard against having to
continue in public office persons guilty of circumscribed conduct, namely,
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." In an
effort to assure that the power of impeachment would be fairly used,
they required that the accused official be given a trial and that the judges,
the Senators, take an oath to hear and try the case impartially. To
limit the possibility of abuse of the impeachment power, each house of
Congress was given a check over the other. The House of Representatives
could not convict or remove an officer but could only initiate impeach-
ment proceedings. Although the Senate could convict and remove, it
could not act unless the House of Representatives had exercised its
initiative. Even then, however, one-third plus one of the members of the
Senate could prevent a conviction. Moreover, if a conviction were en-
tered, the punishment was limited to removal from office and disqualifica-
tion from holding public office in the future.1 3 Punishment that might
attach to the offense as a result of statutory law could be imposed only
by the ordinary courts after indictment, trial and conviction.
To a large extent, the debates at the Constitutional Convention with
regard to impeachment centered around the Presidency. The framers
debated the propriety of making the chief executive, who was to serve
for a fixed term, subject to impeachment. Some expressed the view that
impeachment was unnecessary in the case of an officer serving a fixed
term, since his electors would give their judgment about his conduct at
election time. Others, however, were of the opinion that there were
certain types of acts which might be committed by a public official,
including the President, which would dictate his removal prior to that
time. Among the acts that various delegates suggested as justifying im-
peachment were treason, bribery, corruption, misfeasance, malpractice,
incapacity, neglect of duty, tyrannical and oppressive acts, "great crimes"
and "great and dangerous offenses." These suggestions were made at
272. See text accompanying notes 124-27, 132-33 supra.
273. See 1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 106-11 (Bradley ed. 1945), where
the author compares this limitation with the more extended power of punishment available
to legislative bodies in European countries.
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various times during the Convention debates but before the "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors" expression was suggested by George Mason on
September 8, 1787. While, unfortunately, there was no discussion as to
the meaning of that expression, it seems clear from the references to
British removal practices and the trial of Warren Hastings that it was
taken from the parliamentary law.
In attempting to delineate the meaning of "high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors," reference to English impeachments is helpful and necessary.
It is noteworthy that the grounds for impeachment in most English cases
charged treason, conduct in the nature of treason, criminal and corrupt
acts, or gross abuse of one's official powers. While conduct in violation
of statutory or common law was involved in many cases, it does not
appear that a violation of the positive law was essential to impeach-
ability.- 4 The English cases, on the other hand, furnish little precedent
for impeaching an official for conduct not constituting either a crime
or gross abuse of official duties.
Although the "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" terminology was not
used in any of the early state constitutions, the grounds specified in
many of those constitutions seemed to involve conduct associated with
the duties of public office. "Maladministration," a frequently used ground,
was defined in early dictionaries as mismanagement of one's office.- '
The wording of the impeachment provisions themselves suggests that
the framers contemplated that impeachable offenses would include crimes.
For example, cases of impeachment are excluded from the President's
pardoning power for "offenses against the United States," and cases of
impeachment are excluded from the requirement that "the trial of all
crimes . . . shall be by jury." Moreover, the expression "other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" appears in juxtaposition to the crimes of
"Treason" and "Bribery," suggesting by the use of the word "other"
that it would involve matters of a similar grave nature. While the term
"Misdemeanor" was, as now, used in one sense to delineate a form of
crime that is not a felony,27 the use of the word "Crime" in Article
H, Section 4, would seem to encompass both felonies and misdemeanors.
274. See 1 J. Bryce, The American Commonwealth 47 (1889).
275. See N. Bailey, Dictionary (1753); S. Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language
(3d ed. 1765); T. Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language (1780); P.
Hunter, The Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1885); J. Murray, New English Dictionary 76
(1908).
276. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries I (4th ed. 1771) ; Jacobs Law Dictionary (1st Am.
ed. 1811). See also T. Potts, Compendious Law Dictionary (1813). Most nonlegal dic-
tionaries defined "misdemeanor" merely as behaving one's self ilL See, eg., J. Ash, Diction-
ary of the English Language (1775); N. Bailey, Dictionarium Britaunicum (1730); S. John-
son, Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 1765); T. Sheridan, A General Dictionary
of the English Language (1780).
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Consequently, it may be argued that "Misdemeanors" was intended to
embrace more than criminal conduct; otherwise, its use is superfluous.
If viewed in its component parts, "other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors" is susceptible to another construction: Since a "Crime"
is a violation of an established law and since the prefix "high" denotes
a grave violation, the expression "high Crimes" arguably covers serious
criminal conduct, whether or not connected with the exercise of an office.
The term "Misdemeanor" was also intended to be modified by the word
"high." It would be illogical to limit impeachment to "high Crimes" and
yet have it available for any misdemeanor. Moreover, if Article II, Sec-
tion 4 is considered in connection with the debates, it becomes clear that
the words following "other" were meant to cover offenses of a magnitude
similar to "Treason" and "Bribery." In looking at the meaning of "high
Misdemeanor," one finds it defined as "maladministration."" Yet, if
this be so, why was that term rejected in favor of "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." An answer is that "maladministration," unlike "high
Misdemeanors," was not a term of art and therefore was open to broad
and dangerous interpretations. However, a search for the meaning of
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" from the words themselves ignores
the important fact that the expression was taken bodily from parliamen-
tary usage in England.
The debates at the Constitutional Convention and in the state ratify-
ing conventions reveal that the primary concern of the framers was not
acts that could be committed by any citizen, but rather acts associated
with the exercise of a public trust that could endanger the nation. Thus,
on July 20, in arguing that the President ought to be impeachable,
Madison declared: "He might pervert his administration into a scheme
of peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign pow-
ers." Randolph asserted: "The Executive will have great opportunitys
of abusing his power; particularly in time of war when the military
force, and in some respects the public money will be in his hands."
Morris, who gradually came around to the view that impeachment was
necessary, observed that the President "may be bribed by a greater
interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we ought to
expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign
pay without being able to guard [against] it by displacing him."' 8 On
the day he offered the "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" language, Mason
stated that treason as defined in the Constitution might not include
other "attempts to subvert the Constitution." James Iredell of North
Carolina said in his state's ratifying convention: "[T]he occasion for
277. See, e.g., 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 121 (4th ed. 1771).
278. 2 Farrand 68.
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its exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the community, and
the objects of it may be such as cannot be easily reached by an ordinary
tribunal." A common point made during the discussion of the subject
in the Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina conventions was
that impeachment was an essential safeguard against a public officer
betraying his trust with grave consequences to the country.
The author's examination of the debates at the Constitutional Con-
vention and in the state ratifying conventions indicates that "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" were to be the grounds
of impeachment applicable to all officials subject to impeachment, in-
cluding judges. There is no evidence from the debates that the "good
Behaviour" provision was intended, either directly or indirectly, to fur-
nish an independent or additional ground for impeachment in the case
of judges, or to be read in conjunction with Article II, Section 4, in
such cases. "Good Behaviour" was an expression of "tenure," used to
secure the independence of the judiciary.27
As Hamilton stated in number seventy-eight of The Federalist:
The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy,
is certainly one of the most valuable of the modem improvements in the practice of
government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince;
in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of
the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any
government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the lawvs.29
Later in that paper he said:
[A]s nothing can contribute so much to [the judiciary's] firmness and independence
as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indis-
pensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the
public justice and the public security.28'
At the Constitutional Convention the delegates discussed only two
methods by which judicial tenure could be forfeited: impeachment on
stated grounds; and the British system of address, which allowed for
removal on grounds not warranting impeachment. In rejecting the system
of removal by "address," the debates make clear that impeachment for
279. It is generally agreed that the "good Behaviour" clause was taken from the latin
phrase "quamdiu se bene gesserit," as used in the Act of Settlement. This phrase has been
defined as "[a] clause often used in Letters Patent of the Grant of Offices, as in those to
the Barons of the Exchequer, which must be intended only as to Matters concerning their
office; and is nothing but what the Law would have implied, if the Office had been granted
for life." Cowel's Law Dictionary (1727); see Blount's Law Dictionary (3d. ed. 1717);
Cunningham's Law Dictionary (1764). See generally E. Haynes, The Selection and Tenure
of Judges 25 (1944).
280. 2 The Federalist No. 78, at 99 (Tudor Pub. Co. ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
281. Id. at 100.
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"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" were to
be the only means and grounds by which the legislative branch could
remove judges. In this regard, it is significant that in past American
impeachment trials the House of Representatives has not couched its
charges except in terms of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," believing
it necessary to use some form of the words "Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The implication is that in the view of
past Congresses, no standard other than those contained in Article II,
Section 4, could stand as a separate and additional ground for impeach-
ment.
The use of "during good Behaviour" can be viewed as the framers'
way of saying that judges, unlike other public officers, have a lifetime
tenure but, like other civil officers, may be impeached. If "bad behavior"
is a standard of impeachment, it must be found as part and parcel of
the grounds specified in Article II-irrespective of whether an officer
serves for a fixed term or during good behavior. There is no indication
from the debates that "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors" were meant to be synonymous with "bad behavior," an
expression so vague that had it been suggested, it undoubtedly would
have met the same fate as "maladministration."
Turning to the American impeachment cases for guidance in inter-
pretation, it is noteworthy that the charges have ranged from offenses
of mere intemperate behavior to criminality and have involved miscon-
duct both on and off the bench. Since an impeachment proceeding in-
volves charges which must be proven after a trial by the Senate, an
acquittal may mean that the charges were not proven or, if proven, did
not amount to impeachable offenses in the opinion of the Senate. Aside
from political motivations, an adjudication by the Senate means that
the accused has been proven guilty of conduct which, in the opinion
of the Senate, warrants removal under the Constitution. For that reason,
the convictions are more instructive than the acquittals. In examining
the four cases resulting in convictions, it will be noted that Judge Pick-
ering was convicted of statutory, though non-indictable, violations and
of conduct committed in the exercise of official duties. Judge Humphreys
was convicted of treasonous-like conduct. 82 The value of these cases
282. For various interpretations of Humphreys' conviction, see Brown, The Impeach-
ment of the Federal Judiciary, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 684, 704 (1913) (treason or in nature of
treason); Dougherty, Limitations on Impeachment, 23 Yale LJ. 60, 72 (1913) (treasonable
conduct); Taylor, The American Law of Impeachment, 180 N. Am. Rev. 502, 511 (1905)
(misconduct on the bench); Thomas, The Law of Impeachment in the United States, 2




as precedents, however, is somewhat diminished by the fact that neither
accused defended himself, either in person or by counsel.
While the convictions of Judges Archbald and Ritter are regarded as
senatorial precedents for impeaching judges for a general course of mis-
conduct, whether or not indictable and whether or not connected with
the exercise of official duties, they are subject to other and more narrow
interpretations. It is suggested that the Archbald case stands simply
for the proposition that a judge who willfully, corruptly and improperly
uses the power of his office for personal gain is subject to impeachment.
Judge Ritter, on the other hand, was convicted on an article which in-
corporated charges including statutory violations and criminal offenses.
Although he was acquitted on those charges, it can be argued that fifty-
five of the fifty-six Senators who found him guilty on the general article
did so only because it incorporated specific charges of which they be-
lieved him guilty and on which they had previously voted guilty.
On the basis of his study, the author has concluded that it is not
essential to impeachability that an act be indictable or violate a specific
statutory provision. In framing the impeachment provisions, the concern
of the framers was not limited to crimes of which private citizens and
public officials could be equally guilty. Had that been their concern,
impeachment might not have been necessary, as such offenses could
be handled by the ordinary courts. What the framers seemed greatly
concerned about during their discussion of impeachment was the abuse
or betrayal of a public trust, offenses peculiar to public officials. This
was made manifest by two decisions in particular: their rejection of
the judiciary and the substitution of the Senate as the trial body; and
their limitation of the punishment that could be imposed to removal
from office and future disqualification. The debates reveal that the
framers were heavily motivated in fashioning the impeachment provi-
sions by the possibility of tyrannical, oppressive, corrupt and willful
use of the power connected with a public office. Offenses of this char-
acter, involving as they do the highest officers of the country, required
a special forum. As Montesquieu, whose views had a profound impact
on the framers, said in his classic The Spirit of Laws:
It might also happen that a subject entrusted with the administration of public
affairs, may infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of crimes which the ordi-
nary magistrates either could not or would not punish. But, in general, the legislative
power cannot try causes; and much less can it try this particular case, where it repre-
sents the party aggrieved which is the people. It can only therefore impeach. But be-
fore what court shall it bring its impeachment; must it go and demean itself before
the ordinary tribunals which are its inferiors, and being composed moreover of men
who are chosen from the people as well as itself, will naturally be swayed by the
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authority of so powerful an accuser? No: in order to preserve the dignity of the peo-
ple, and the security of the subject, the legislative part which represents the people,
must bring in its charge before the legislative part which represents the nobility, who
have neither the same interests, nor the same passions.283
Richard Wooddeson, the English historian, stated in his lectures at
Oxford in 1776 that:
It is certain that magistrates and officers entrusted with the administration of public
affairs may abuse their delegated powers to the extensive detriment of the community
and at the same time in a manner not properly cognizable before the ordinary tribu-
nals. The influence of such delinquents and the nature of such offenses may not
unsuitably engage the authority of the highest court and the wisdom of the sagest
assembly. The Commons, therefore, as the grand inquest of the nation, became suitors
for penal justice, and they can not consistently, either with their own dignity or with
safety to the accused, sue elsewhere but to those who share with them in the legis-
lature.
On this policy is founded the origin of impeachments, which began soon after the
constitution assumed its present form.2 8 4
He observed that "[s]uch kind of misdeeds, however, as peculiarly
injure the commonwealth by the abuse of high offices of trust, are most
proper-and have been the most usual-grounds for this kind of prose-
cution.) 2
85
A limitation of impeachment to indictable crimes was not, in the
author's opinion, the intent of the framers and is not a proper interpre-
tation of the constitutional provisions. On the other hand, the extension
of impeachment to non-indictable offenses not connected with the use
of official power was not within the intendment of the framers and is
not supported by English impeachment precedents.
To be impeachable, an act must fall within one of two categories.
It must violate some known, established law, be of a grave nature, and
involve consequences highly detrimental to the United States. In the
alternative, it must involve evil, corrupt, wilful, malicious or gross con-
283. C. Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 118 (6th ed. 1793).
284. 2 R. Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws of England 596-97 (1792).
Wooddeson elaborated on his views by stating: "Thus, if a lord chancellor be guilty of
bribery, or of acting grossly contrary to the duty of his office, if the judges mislead their
sovereign by unconstitutional opinions, if any other magistrate attempt to subvert the
fundamental laws, or introduce arbitra. power, these have been deemed cases adapted to
parliamentary inquiry and decision. So where a lord chancellor has been thought to have
put the seal to an ignominous treaty, a lord admiral to neglect the safeguard of the sea,
an ambassador to betray his trust, a privy counsellor to propound or support pernicious
and dishonorable measures or a confidential adviser of his sovereign to obtain exorbitant
grants or incompatible employments, these imputations have properly occasioned impeach-
ments; because it is apparent how little the ordinary tribunals are calculated to take cog-
nizance of such offences, or to investigate and reform the general polity of the state." Id.
at 602.
285. Id. at 601.
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duct in the discharge of office to the great detriment of the United States.
Acts which result from error of judgment or omission of duty, without
the presence of fraud, or from the misconception of duty, without the
presence of a willful disregard, are not impeachable.8- 0 Acts of a non-
indictable nature outside of one's office, such as writing books and
articles, associating with persons and organizations engaged in question-
able activities, delivering speeches of a political nature, and engaging
in conduct which some view as socially and morally objectionable are
not properly within the scope of impeachment. Indeed, it would be in-
congruous to find an official exercising constitutional rights of speech
and association guilty of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" against the
United States. When a public official engages in private, independent
conduct, he is subject to the positive laws as any other citizen, except
that if he commits a "high Crime," he is subject to the additional punish-
ment of impeachment and removal from office.
In a nation which espouses the rule of law and which abhors bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws, it certainly would be desirable to
define by statute all the acts constituting "high Crimes and Misdemean-
ors." However, since power can be corruptly used in so many different
286. The author's view of what is impeachable is by no means original. See, eg., State
v. Hastings, 37 Neb. 96, 55 N.W. 774 (1893); Ferguson v. Maddox, 114 Tex. 85, 263 S.W.
888 (1924). See also note 57 supra. For the views of various commentators, see 1 J. Bryce,
The American Commonwealth 47, 208 (1889) (acts in violation of official duty and against
the interests of the nation); C. Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution 87 (1922)
(willful or corrupt misconduct in office or acts of a criminal character); T. Cooley, The
General Principles of Constitutional Law 177-78 (3d ed. 1898) (serious abuses or betrayals
of trust and whatever is deserving of the process in the opinion of Congress); 1 G. Curtis,
Constitutional History of the United States 481-82 (1889) (violation of law plus unfitness
to exercise office due to immorality, imbecility or maladministration); 1 A. de Tocquevilie,
Democracy in America 108, 110 (Bradley ed. 1945) (Senate "generally obliged" to find an
offense at common law but no reason to tie them to the "exact definitions of criminal
law."); R. Foster, Commentaries on the Constitution § 93 (1895) (offenses ranging from
breach of official duty to off duty speeches encouraging insurrection); 1 J. Kent, Commen-
taries on American Law 319-21 (9th ed. 1858) (corrupt violations of public trust); J.
Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States 483-93 (1868)
(breaches of trust and acts relating to an official's duties and functions) ; W. Rawle, A View
of the Constitution 209-19 (2d ed. 1829) (abuses of important trusts affecting the higher
interest of society); F. Sheppard, The Constitutional Text-Book 75 (1855) (violations of
law, acts of a political and extraordinary nature, misdemeanors in office, and violations of
a public trust); 1 J. Tucker, The Constitution of the United States § 200 (1899) (criminal
misbehavior, a purposed defiance of official duty, and lack of good behavior); 2 D. Watson,
The Constitution of the United States 1032-37 (1910) (misconduct in office in exercise or
non-exercise of a power and public misbehavior that would shame the country); W. Wil-
loughby, Constitutional History of the United States §§ 927-34 (2d ed. 1929) (offenses of a
political character and gross betrayals of the public interest). See generally 1 J. Story, Com-
mentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 796-805 (Sth ed. 1905).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ways, it would be a difficult, if not impossible, task to carve out for
every office whose occupant is subject to impeachment, including that
of the Presidency, a satisfactory body of laws describing everything
that is permissible and impermissible. Many of the powers that attach
to a public office must, of necessity, involve discretion. If statutes were
enacted,28 7 they would have to be of a general nature so as not to
restrict the freedom of action and latitude that a public official requires
in the discharge of his office. The benefits that might follow from the
establishment of such a body of law would seem to be outweighed by
the risks to freedom of action that would be incurred.
While the potential for abuse of the impeachment power may exist
in any standard which permits impeachment for non-statutory offenses,
this must be balanced against the potential danger to the nation arising
from abuse of an official's power. Unless one found a violation of some
specific provision of law, we would be powerless to remove from office a
public official who willfully, corruptly, recklessly and maliciously used his
power to the great injury of the country. In this connection, it is important
to note that the construction which is given to the impeachment pro-
visions applies to every official-Presidents as well as judges. As was
stated by John W. Davis at the Archbald impeachment trial:
To say that a judge need take as the guide of his conduct only the statutes and the
common law with reference to crimes, and that so long as he remains within their
narrow confines he is safe in his position, is to overlook the larger part of the duties
of his office and of the restraints and obligations which it imposes upon him. We insist
that the prohibitions contained in the criminal law by no means exhaust the judicial
decalogue. Usurpation of power, the entering and enforcement of orders beyond his
jurisdiction, disregard or disobedience of the rulings of superior tribunals, unblushing
287. For statutes involving criminal sanctions against members of the judiciary, see 18
U.S.C. § 155 (1964) (knowingly approving the payment of fixed fees in bankruptcy); Id.
§ 203 (directly or indirectly seeking compensation for the performance of duty, other than
as provided by law); id. § 205 (financial sharing in claims against the government In which
they assist without authority); id. § 291 (Supp. V, 1970) (purchasing at less than face
value certain claims for expenses against the United States). For statutory provisions
relating to judicial discretion see 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1964) (disqualification for personal bias
or prejudice); id. § 455 (disqualification when judge has a substantial interest in the case) ;
id. § 958 (limitation on the appointment of receivers); 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964) (restraints
on power to punish for contempt). See also 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (1964) (a district court
judge "shall reside in the district or one of the districts for which he is appointed"); Id.
§ 296 (judges shall discharge all judicial duties to which they are designated and assigned).
Upon entering office, a judge takes the following oath: "I [name], do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the
poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all
the duties incumbent upon me as [title] according to the best of my abilities and understand-
ing, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God." Id. § 453.
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and notorious partiality and favoritism, indolence and neglect, all are violations of his
official oath, yet none may be indictable.288
The standard for impeachment suggested by this article does not
totally eliminate the possibility of congressional abuse of this power.
In contrast, the potential harm which can be caused by the abuse of
power lodged in the hands of a single public official should not be
minimized. It is suggested that the probability of abuse of power is
greater where power is concentrated than where it is diffused among
many. Furthermore, while the Constitution states that the House has
the sole power to impeach and the Senate the sole power to try, it can
be argued that the Supreme Court has, as in the case of other legislative
acts, the power to declare that a particular act does not constitute a
"high Crime and Misdemeanor" and, therefore, that Congress has ex-
ceeded its power in removing an official.28 9
The suggestion made during the current session of Congress that an
impeachable offense is whatever a majority of a particular Congress
says it is, after the fact, is not only unsupported by the Constitution
but it is a dangerous doctrine. -2 90 If accepted, it would not only pose a
serious threat to the independence of the other branches of government
but it might gravely limit the freedom which public officials require
in discharging the duties of office. Indeed, as applied to judges, it would
be tantamount to amending the Constitution by legislative fiat so as to
provide for the procedure of address-a procedure specifically rejected
at the Constitutional Convention as seriously encroaching upon the in-
dependence of the judiciary.
While the conduct of judges and other public officials should reflect
favorably on the institutions of which they are members, the failure
to maintain such conduct, if it does not involve an indictable offense
or a willful or corrupt use of power, is not a ground for impeachment.
The benefits that might be derived from dealing with personal mis-
conduct of a non-indictable nature and not related to the exercise of
official power clearly are outweighed by the risks that would be incurred
by giving Congress power to impeach for any reason whatsoever. The
remedy for correcting the failure of officials to maintain the highest stan-
dards of conduct may be in improving the appointive process, and in
other restraints that presently exist within our system through the in-
288. 50 Cong. Rec. 1266 (1914).
289. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 US. 486 (1969).
290. Indeed, this is made dear by the debates at the Convention. As noted, the framers
specifically rejected the term "maladministration" lest an impeachable offense be equated to
whatever a particular Congress said it meant (see text accompanying notes 132-33 supra).
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fluence of public opinion, colleagues, members of other branches of
government, and bar associations. If experience demonstrates that ad-
ditional legal restraints are necessary, there may be areas where legisla-
tion can be passed, and if it becomes essential, the Constitution can be
amended.291
Impeachment should be resorted to only for cases of the gravest kind.
The process of removing should be made as difficult as possible, though
not to the extent of leaving the nation powerless to remove an official
who betrays his public trust. If there be any doubt as to the gravity of
an offense or as to an official's conduct or motives, the doubt should be
resolved in his favor. In the author's opinion, this is the necessary price
for having an Independent Judiciary and Executive. Tampering with
that price by seeking to broaden the impeachment power invites the
use of power "as a means of crushing political adversaries or ejecting
them from office."292 Nothing could be more destructive of our system of
government.
291. 2 Am. Hist. Ass'n Ann. Rep. 1896, at 149-51 (1897), discussing proposed amend-
ments to the Constitution with respect to the removal of federal judges.
292. Simpson, Federal Impeachments, 64 U. Pa. L. Rev. 803, 812 (1916), citing a state-
ment attributed to de Tocqueville "that a decline of public morals in the United States
would probably be marked by the abuse of the power of impeachment as a means of
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DEAN WILLIAM HUGHES MULLIGAN
F OR the past fifteen years, Fordham Law School has enjoyed the ener-
getic and creative guidance of a true professional-Dean William
Hughes Mulligan. In administering the needs of the Law School, Dean
Mulligan has always employed his vast abilities with a perceptive regard
for the proper balance between the competing interests inevitable in the
modern educational institution. He has represented the Law School as an
extremely effective public speaker able to combine the deep sincerity with
which he undertook his task with a delightful sense of humor.
As an instructor, Dean Mulligan's thoughtful analysis and accurate
scholarship, combined with a willingness to remain openminded in debate,
have commanded the respect of his students. His teaching proficiency lies
not only in the ability to expound fundamental legal concepts, but also in
the power to arouse in a student the capacity for thinking.
Over and above his prowess as dean and instructor stands the man
himself. In addition to great enthusiasm and prodigious energy, Dean
Mulligan is possessed of a happy and unique combination of uncompro-
mising integrity, genuine warmth, and lively wit.
His decision to step down as dean will result in an irreparable loss to
Fordham, only partially mitigated by his continued presence on the
faculty. In recognition and appreciation of his total devotion to Fordham
and to the students who have commenced their lives in the legal profession
under his guidance, the thirty-ninth volume of the Fordham Law Review
is dedicated, in respect and with esteem, to Dean William Hughes Mul-
ligan.
THE EDITORS
WILLIAM HUGHES MULLIGAN-AN APPRECIATION
4 FIORELLO I" was not yet a musical. The man himself was masquer-
ading as the mayor of the City of New York. With consummate
grace a youthful Joe DiMaggio was roaming centerfield for the New York
Yankees and Yankee domination left baseball a little monotonous. In
entertainment radio was king-sparkled by the occasional stroll of Jack
Benny and Mary Livingstone down Allen's Alley. But radio's reign was
not long to last. Over in the Flushing meadows, in the shadow of the Try-
Ion and the Perisphere, visitors looked with disbelief upon a boxed picture
called television. Though the hobnail boot of the Nazi had already been
heard on the cobblestones of Prague and swastika tanks were rumbling
into Poland, the world was young then and "all the trees were green." At
Fordham Law School, high up in the Woolworth Building, one might have
noted a day in September which marked the very first beginnings of the
emergence of Fordham to an ultimate position of preeminence in legal
education.
On one of those young September days, Bill Mulligan rode the D train
down from the Concourse, was swooshed up twenty-eight floors of vertical
travel, and registered at the Law School. He was a tall, skinny lad-yes,
amazing as it may now seem, a tall splinter of a lad. He registered simply
as William Mulligan. Four score and ten pounds later he changed his
name to William Hughes Mulligan. And legend has it that the insertion
of that celebrated center name led to a deanship. The legend, like most
legends, is hollow. To that, I propose to attest.
In those days of Fordham-in-the-Woolworth-Building, Bill Mulligan
was challenged by great teachers, by John Blake and George Bacon,
Ignatius Wilkinson and Maurice Wormser. Those who knew Bill then
knew that-were he to will it and were he willing to work at it-he could
and would join that circle of great teachers. He willed it and he was will-
ing to work, and work most arduously, at it.
When he joined the faculty, Fordham had already left the overly pol-
ished, non-academic boxes which, in the Woolworth Building, passed for
a law school. Fordham had started its move uptown. Quite a move I It was
then at 302 Broadway, an archaic, mercantile building on whose outer
facing a Latin scholar inscribed the thought that "Ignatius loved the
teeming cities." But there was no denying that In-Town-Fordham was
ready to seek more space to breathe. Fordham's president, Father Lau-
rence McGinley, had started his search for a dean to plan and to build
a new Law School. Archbishop Hughes, who presided at the formal open-
ing of Fordham College in 1841 and whose statue looks down upon the
Rose Hill Administration Building, must have smiled an exuberant smile
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when William Hughes Mulligan, his collateral descendant, was named to
the deanship.
The granite archbishop had good reason to smile. There were, to be
sure, wise deans before him-Wilkinson and Bacon, for example-who
were of impeccable integrity. Bill Mulligan has integrity in abundance.
Indeed his integrity, his honesty, his frankness bubbles out of him as
readily as his wit and wisdom. But those attributes alone do not signify
the strength of the man or mark his greatest contribution to Fordham.
Nor does the Law School building here at Lincoln Center, which he as
dean came to plan and over which he has since presided. The Law School
here at Lincoln Center may well stand as a physical sign of Bill Mul-
ligan's success. But the building is no more than a symbol.
What I am struggling to say-to dare to admit-is that fifteen years
ago Fordham Law School students did not travel-and could not easily
buy passage-in Harvard, Columbia and Michigan circles. Today Ford-
ham is preeminent in legal education-second neither to Harvard, nor
Columbia, nor Michigan. Fifteen years ago when Bill Mulligan was named
dean of Fordham Law School, Fordham had, I know, the makings of
excellence. In those short fifteen years, while all the world grew old, Bill
Mulligan brought excellence to maturity. That excellence, not mortar, nor
stone, nor shining marble, is his gift to Fordham.
LEONARD F. MANNING
ALPIN J. CAMERON PROFESSOR OF LAW
DEAN WILLIAM HUGHES MULLIGAN-A TRIBUTE
IT is with genuine regret that the entire University has learned of Dean
William H. Mulligan's decision to step down as Dean of the Fordham
Law School at the end of the current academic year. Dean Mulligan has
served the Law School with great distinction for almost twenty-five years,
first as a member of the faculty and subsequently as Dean, a post he has
held for the past fifteen years.
Dean Mulligan's association with Fordham has been a long and fruitful
one. He entered Fordham College as a freshman in 1935 and, after gradu-
ating with honors, enrolled in the Law School in 1939 from which he,
similarly, graduated with honors in 1942. After four years of service with
the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps, he returned to the Law School
and has been continuously associated with it since 1946.
In 1956, young Professor Mulligan was asked to become Dean of the
School. He assumed the leadership of the Law School at a critical period,
for it was during the early days of his administration that plans for the
new building and the School's move to Lincoln Center from downtown
Manhattan were being developed. Dean Mulligan played a very signifi-
cant role in the design of the School's new quarters. The handsome struc-
ture which evolved from the endless days and hours of planning is due in
no small way to his appreciation for the right blend between the practical
and the aesthetic.
But it was not just bricks and mortar that preoccupied the young Dean
at that time. For he was even more deeply engaged in strengthening the
Law School and moving it to the forefront of legal education in the United
States. His efforts to strengthen the faculty, expand and intensify the
curriculum quickly caught the attention of the professional associations
and the legal profession in general. During his years of stewardship, in-
terest in Fordham's Law School greatly expanded, with the result that
today it is barely able to admit one in seven applicants, and its graduates
are avidly sought by law firms, government, and individual private enter-
prise. However, the recognition achieved by the Law School did not come
easily. It could not have been realized by one with lesser talents, desire,
tenacity, and toughness of mind than Bill Mulligan brought to his assign-
ment. As any administrator or fellow dean who locked horns with him
on budgetary and other matters can attest, he was a worthy adversary.
He gave no quarter to any man, and it is owing to his persistence and will
to fight for what he thought was in the best interests of the Law School,
which he always insisted were synonomous with those of the entire Uni-
versity, that the Law School enjoys the prominence it does at the present
time.
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However, Dean Mulligan's accomplishments have not been restricted to
teaching and administration. He has succeeded in coupling a brilliant
academic career with an equally illustrious one in public service. His
achievements outside the classroom and away from the administrator's
desk would be impressive even for one who devoted all of his time and
energies to them. Since 1958, Dean Mulligan has served as a Member of
the Law Revision Commission in the State of New York. In 1964, he
served as Chairman of the Citizens' Committee on Reapportionment. In
that year, too, he was appointed Chairman of the Examining Board of the
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority and has con-
tinued to serve in that capacity since that time. He was intimately
involved in the New York State Constitutional Convention during the mid-
sixties, serving first as a Member of the Commission, making arrange-
ments for the holding of the Convention, and subsequently as General
Counsel to the Republican Delegation at the Convention. In 1968, he was
appointed as a Member of the Advisory Council for the Labor and Man-
agement Improper Practices Act. Early this year, he was designated as a
Member of the State Commission to Review Legislative and Judicial
Salaries and more recently was appointed by the Presiding Justice of the
Appellate Division to the Committee on the Administration of the Courts.
Dean Mulligan's accomplishments have not gone unnoticed either in or
out of the University. He holds honorary degrees from Saint Peter's Col-
lege and Siena College. He has also been honored by Manhattan College
which in 1967 awarded him the Saint John de LaSalle Medal. His own
Alma Mater has acknowledged his many accomplishments by bestowing
upon him the Alumni Achievement Award and the coveted Encaenia
Medal. But Dean Mulligan's professional contributions, albeit formidable,
cannot transcend in importance the exemplary life he has led as a Chris-
tian gentleman; and so he was very fittingly honored in 1968 by induction
into the Knights of Malta. Bricks and mortar, the development and en-
richment of the faculty, his involvement with alumni and legal associations
were a second to his concern, interest and personal involvement with the
students of the Law School. He gave of himself generously and unstint-
ingly to the personal anxieties and desires of students at the Law School.
For years his door has been wide open to students. We are happy and
pleased that he intends to remain as a Professor where he will be given
even more opportunities to relate closely and intimately with students.
As we contemplate the many successes which Dean Mulligan has
achieved at the Law School in such a short period of years, all of us in
the University cannot help but feel an extra surge of pride, because he
belongs not only to the Law School but to Fordham. We are proud of him
not only because of his scholarly, administrative and professional accom-
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plishments, but more importantly because he personifies so well those
qualities of character, intellect, and personality which Fordham has
traditionally sought to develop in her alumni.
Although we are saddened that Dean Mulligan's stewardship, under
which the Law School waxed so prosperously, is coming to a close, our
sorrow is tempered by joy and gratitude. Fordham is joyful because
it is proud of his accomplishments and grateful because he has been such
a loyal and excellent alumnus.
In behalf of the entire University I want to wish him, his lovely wife,
Roseanne, and his three children good health, continued success, and
many more years of happy association with the Law School and the
Fordham Community.
MICHAL P. WALSH, S.J.
PRESIDENT
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